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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis interpreteer aspekte van die implementeringsproses van ‘Enterprise Resource 
Planning Systems’ (ERP) in die openbare sektor, en in die besonder op plaaslike 
regeringsvlak. Die interpetasie word gedoen met behulp van die sinmakingteorie van KE 
Weick en van kompleksiteitsteorie. 
Hoofstuk 1 bied ‘n oorsig oor die agtergrond en doelstelling van die tesis, sowel as die 
metodologiese aanpak. 
In hoofstuk 2 word die teoretiese grondslae van die tesis bespreek. Die teorie word 
geïntegreer om ‘n nuwe perspektief op die analise van ERP implementering te kan gee. 
Hoofstuk 3 bied ‘n gedetailleerde beskrywing van die geval wat hier ondersoek word, 
naamlik ‘Programme Phakama’ wat die implementering van ‘n ERP in die stad van 
Johannesburg behels het. 
Hoofstuk 4 span die net wyer om vergelykende gegewens van soortgelyke projekte elders te 
beskryf. 
Hoofstuk 5 ontleed die problematiek en toon dat die gebruik van kompleksiteitsteorie en insig 
in sinmaking help om die verskynsel beter te begryp. 
Hoofstuk 6 maak gevolgtrekkings vir die bestuur van sodanige projekte. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis provides an interpretation of what happens during Enterprise Resource Planning 
Systems (ERP) adoption in the Public Sector and in particular Local Government using 
Sensemaking and Complexity Theory.  
Chapter 1 outlines the background and objective of the thesis including the methodologies 
used.  
In Chapter 2 the theoretical foundations of the study are discussed. The theories are carefully 
meshed together to provide a new angle to interpret and analyse what takes place in ERP 
adoption. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the case study, Programme Phakama. Programme 
Phakama implemented an Enterprise Resource Planning solution in the City of Johannesburg. 
Chapter 4 contains an explanation of what happened in other projects with the same mandate 
within the public service elsewhere in the world. This in comparison to what happened in 
Project Phakama, to highlight the similarities or differences during the evolvement of the 
projects.   
The last two chapters provide the interpretation and recommendations using the conclusion 
arrived at in Chapter 4 from a Complexity and Sensemaking perspective. There are no right 
or wrong answers in ERP projects, only good or bad decisions. The number of changes to be 
managed in ERP projects is overwhelming. Therefore many projects are challenged, 
regardless of success, failure or abandonment.  
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Chapter 1 
 
ERP Systems - 
 Adoption and Complexity 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Organisations are adapting to the rapidly changing global trends in order to remain relevant 
and also to survive. This is one of the main characteristics of the Knowledge Economy (KE) 
with which every organisation is faced. Knowledge Economy is the environment in which 
productivity is derived from the interaction of knowledge upon knowledge rather than raw 
material1. The key value adding element in the KE is knowledge.  Information Technology 
(IT) is one of the fast growing / changing sectors that is constantly improving.  IT is often 
used by organisations to drive improvements of services and /or products. Among the most 
pervasive organisational changes and activities in the last decade or so has been the 
implementation of enterprise-wide information technologies such as Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) systems2 
                                                 
1 Coke P, Schwartz D. 2008. Regional Knowledge Economies: An EU-UK and Israel Perspective. Royal Dutch  
  Geographical Society KPMG, 10 
2 Morris M G, Venkatesh V. 2010. Job Characteristics and Job Satisfaction: Understanding the Role of  
  Enterprise Resource Planning Systems Implementation. MIS Quarterly 24 (1;) 143 - 161 
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The public sector has not been excluded from implementing information technology solutions 
to improve service delivery, the sector cannot afford to ignore these global issues. Local 
government in particular, in the lowest sphere of government, has also joined others in using 
information systems for its own transformation and service improvements. These major 
technology improvements are implemented mainly though projects. Another major 
characteristic of the Knowledge Economy is the complexity that organisations must cope 
with. It is broadly accepted that good governance, specialisation and a good management 
approach are significant requirements of this era to manage complexity that often leads to 
chaos if unattended. Simple IT products no longer provide solutions to the problems posed by 
and experienced during the Knowledge Economy. In light of the context given above, the 
City of Johannesburg (CoJ) made a decision to provide a usable, sustainable, replicable and 
reliable Information Technology solution, an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system to 
solve its problems of customer relations management and revenue collection and 
management. Thus in response to many of the inherent requirements of the Knowledge 
Economy and in order to survive, specialize (knowledge), invest in ICT and manage 
complexity, Programme Phakama, a project to implement the ERP solution, was designed.  
1.2 What is an ERP System? 
The definition of complexity on its own is a complex matter. According to 
www.dictionary.com, the word complex is defined as ‘a whole made up of various 
interconnected or related parts and complexity as “a state or quality of being intricate or 
complex”. Jackson defines a system as a complex whole, the functioning of which depends 
on its parts and the interaction between those parts3. The definition of complexity and that of 
a system demonstrate that they share similar features. The definition of a system implies that 
in any system complexity is inborn, which is brought about as a result of the relationship 
between the various parts. ERPs have become important applications for all industries. 
Becerra-Fernadez I, Gonzalez A, Sabherwal R defines an ERP system as a business 
                                                 
3 Jackson M C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers, 3 
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management system that integrates all facets of the business including planning, 
manufacturing, sales and marketing into a single integrated application that is executed on a 
single database to support the entire enterprise4.  The definition indicates that ERP is a system 
with various components or facets of business integrated together using a common set of data 
to achieve the organisation’s goals and implied complexity. An ERP system also constitutes 
various parts that interact with one another to give meaning to the whole. All parts of an ERP 
system are interconnected. ERPs are regarded as an effective approach most organisations 
implement to enhance productivity and performance. It is a systematic approach used to 
organise resources for efficiency.  ERPs automate business processes across various 
functional areas. Two main issues arise, the phrase system and implied complexity. Alhadeff-
Jones states that ‘complexity cannot be something which would be defined in a simple way, 
and would replace simplicity. Complexity is a word-problem and not a word-solution’5. The 
definition of ERP elucidates its systemic features and its inherent complexity due to the 
relationship and interconnectedness of its parts.  
Characteristics of an ERP system include the following: 
1. It entails an enterprise-wide focus on resources  
2. Entails a business process view and not a functional view  
3. Consists of applications (parts) that provide an organisation with knowledge to 
manage their core business 
4. Integrates a number of an organisation’s business processes  
5. Processes the majority of an organisation’s transactions  
6. Allows access to real time data 
7. Integrates transaction processing and planning activities 
Analysis of the above characteristics reveals that most, if not all, can also be said about a 
system and complexity, where there is integration of the parts which constitute the whole – 
hence the holistic view. The various facets or parts of an ERP are what eventually give 
                                                 
4 Becerra-Fernandez I, Gonzalez A, Sabherwal R. 2004. Knowledge Management Challenges, Solutions and  
  Technologies, 359. 
5 Alhadeff-Jones M. 2008. Three Generations of Complexity Theories: Nuances and Ambiguities. Education 
  Philosophy and Theory, 40(1); 66 - 82 
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meaning to the ERP system as a whole.  ERPs have become a necessity for all organisations 
regardless of kind of industry because of the increased nature of the interconnectedness of 
problems, processes and environments. Ross and Vitale assert that ERPs are fundamental for 
organizations to thrive and survive6. The Knowledge Economy is complex naturally and the 
need and intensity of knowledge is very high both horizontally and vertically. The system 
assists organisations to embed knowledge both vertically and horizontally. ERPs also enable 
integration with external stakeholders, i.e. customers, suppliers, third parties, etc. which 
brings a different type of complexity throughout the life cycle of an ERP project. This also 
reflects that ERP systems embrace the external environment.  Additionally they are a tool that 
organisations use to enable effective management of knowledge; therefore Knowledge 
Management (KM) is at the core of ERP systems. Knowledge Management lies at the centre 
of many interrelated problems ERPs are intended to resolve in organisations.   
 
Figure 1: ERP and KM (Author’s Formulation) 
                                                 
6 Ross J W, Vitale M R. 2000. The ERP Revolution: Surviving vs Thriving. Information Systems Frontiers, 2 
 (2); 233 - 241 
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Figure 1 above illustrates the relationship between Knowledge Management, the core 
processes in an organisation, and the external environment. The model shows the relationship 
between various parts of the ERP system and the external environment, with Knowledge 
Management at the heart of the relationship, all brought together which are brought together 
through using an ERP system ERP emerges from the interaction between the parts which 
affects each other through complex networks of complexity. KM is driven by the same 
elements that influence the organisation to make decisions on solutions such as ERPs. 
Amongst others, KM is driven by increasing domain complexity, the accelerating market 
volatility, an increasingly high pace of change, diminishing individual knowledge and 
intensified need for speed, responsiveness, sustenance of efficiency, continuous 
improvement, innovation, and more. As a result organisations have a great need to manage 
their organisational knowledge so that they can adequately respond to or address the elements 
that drive KM. ERPs provides a more sound starting point – all organisational knowledge is 
centralised, the relationships are managed and knowledge is embedded, which are the 
fundamentals of an effective knowledge management implementation in any organisation.  
 
It suffices therefore to say that in this era the commodity at the centre of everything that an 
organisation does is knowledge, no matter how one looks at it. Knowledge is also the 
commodity that gives an organisation capability to deal with or handle complexity and its 
challenges. Therefore knowledge is a commodity by which organisations are able to do what 
is needed to survive and a commodity which organisations strive to retain it.  ERP is not a 
Knowledge Management solution, however it is a solution that enables the management of 
knowledge by pooling all the knowledge together and the relationship thereof, which is 
required to manage an organisation successfully. It lays the foundation for KM 
implementation. 
 
Figure 1 above illustrates the high level of complex relationships between various parts that 
the ERP system is enabling and managing. It is therefore suitable to say that problems in this 
era of the Knowledge Economy have become so complex and are interlinked that they require 
complex solutions. Solving the complex problems with a complex solution such as ERP will 
thus always be a compound and multifaceted exercise regardless of the good planning, 
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adequate resources, and other components. ERPs are complex and their implementation can 
be challenging, time consuming and an expensive undertaking for any company7. There is no 
guarantee of a successful outcome even with significant investment in time and resources. 
ERP systems, also referred to as Enterprise Systems (ES) are among the most important 
business information technologies that have emerged in the last decade8. The implementation 
of ERP systems causes greater change with broader impacts on employees than any other 
system.  
1.3 The Research Question 
Previous research focusing on IT projects implemented in the United States, Africa and South 
Africa have provided reasons for and statistics relating to the successes and failures of 
information technology projects.9 Some of these have examined common causes of failure 
and success in large IT projects, producing a list of common causes of both failures and 
success in Public Sector projects in general.10 The global failure rate is still high.  The CoJ, 
just like many organisations in the world, holding the optimistic view that technology will 
improve matters, made a decision to implement SAP CRM (Customer Relations 
Management) and SAP ISU. It is a government initiative with a customer centric approach. 
However, the success rate of many e-government initiatives in the country is very lean as 
most ICT experts believe SA is not yet e-ready11 E-government and ICT are seen as elements 
                                                 
7 Schoenherr T, Hilpert D, Soni A K, Venkataraman M A. Mabert V. 2010. Enterprise Systems Complexity and 
its Antecedents: A Grounded-Theory Approach. International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, 30(6) 639 - 665 
8 Chung B, Skibniewski M J, Lucas H C, Kwak Y. 2008. Analyzing Enterprise Resource Planning System 
Implementation Success Factors in the Engineering-Construction industry. Journal of Computing in Civil 
Engineering, November / December; 373 - 382 
9 One such research report was conducted by Sonnekus R, Labuschagne L. 2003.  IT Project Management 
Maturity versus Project Success in South Africa.See Also: Nash K. 2000. Companies don’t Learn from 
Precious IT Snafus. ComputerWorld, October 30, andUmble E J, Umble M M. 2002. Avoiding ERP 
Implementation Failure. Industrial Management, 44 (1);25 - 33 
10 The Royal Academy of Engineering, The British Computer Society. 2004. The Challenges of Complex IT 
Projects: The Report of a Working Group from RoyalAcademy of Engineering & The British Computer 
Society. 4  
11 eGovernment Conference. 2009. Available: www.itweb.co.za/events/egovernment/2009. During the 
conference proceedings, the e-readiness of South African government and its customers when it comes to ICT 
roll out for e-government was questioned. 
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of a larger government modernization program. As will be shown later, it is now clear that 
even when best practises were followed, adequate planning, good governance, and sound 
project management afforded to the ERP implementation project by the City of Johannesburg 
(CoJ), it however did not turn out as intended.  It must be noted that the scale of the Phakama 
project is vast. It must further be noted that it being an e-government project, factors that are 
not usually present in private sector environments have to be factored in on top of the usual 
intricacies that are part and parcel of ERP systems implementations. At least two things stand 
out: governments cannot choose their customers, but have to service the entire community; 
and governments are primarily driven by political concerns which easily work at cross 
purposes with sound technical practice. 
 
The underlying assumption of this thesis is that conventional approaches to analyse ERP 
systems implementation are not adequate to interpret the complexities of an e-government 
project of this size and nature. The starting point of the thesis is the assertion that insights 
form Complexity theory and Sensemaking theory is needed to achieve a more sophisticated 
understanding. The research question, therefore, is: What is the interpretation of what 
happened in Programme Phakama and why did it happen that way, by looking at it from the 
perspective of complexity and sensemaking theory? The research objective is not limited to 
understanding what happened in Programme Phakama only, but to arrive at a general answer 
by studying other ERP projects in South Africa and other countries. It is hoped that an answer 
to the above question will help organisations move to a more sophisticated understanding of 
the challenges facing management in conditions of high complexity in e-government 
applications. 
1.4 Methodology 
The thesis is the product of a primarily conceptual study anchored in Sensemaking and 
Complexity Theory and also System Development. This is a qualitative research study that 
employs an empirical approach to arrive to a conceptual outcome.  The study is empirical 
because it investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context and produce 
findings that are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the study. It takes the form 
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of a case study on the ERP system implementation in the City of Johannesburg. The aim of 
the research is to develop a conceptual outcome that can be used in management practice 
beyond the City of Johannesburg.  Written data sources for an empirical research can include 
published and unpublished documents, company reports, newspaper articles, letters, reports 
and so forth. The data used for the case study is not broadly published except in this study 
and was made available through the consent by the source, the City of Johannesburg 
specifically for this study. Accordingly, chapter 3 predominantly references the data and the 
graphs produced by the CoJ. The data used is not published material but produced by and for 
CoJ internal use during the implementation of the Programme Phakama.  Empirical data is 
also collected that provided the base for the theories used and evaluation of other projects that 
are similar to Programme Phakama to arrive to a widely applicable solution or understanding.  
Sensemaking and Complexity theory are applied to develop an alternative management 
understanding that can be more effective.  
The thesis is limited in two ways.  
One, it does not focus primarily on economic, sociological, political or technological factors 
per se. These factors are indeed present and worth investigating in their own right. The thesis, 
however, is confined to investigating the evolution of Phakama at a holistic level through the 
application of the conceptual theories stated. 
Two, although the implementation process of project Phakama is still on-going, the picture 
painted of the project in this thesis is restricted to the period 2006 (when it started) and 2009. 
This is a sufficient period to allow one to see the role of complexity and sensemaking in such 
a project. 
1.5 Outline of Chapters 
The chapters of the thesis are as follows;  
1. The conceptual background of Complexity Theory, Sensemaking Theory and Systems 
Development are discussed in Chapter 2. The theories are carefully meshed together to 
provide a new angle to interpret and analyse what takes place in ERP adoption.  
2. A description of the Programme Phakama ERP project  is provided in Chapter 3 
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3. A review of ERP implementation projects similar to Programme Phakama are presented 
in Chapter 4 to demonstrate that it is not an isolated case. 
4. Interpretation of what happens in ERP projects using the theory of complexity and 
Sensemaking is presented in Chapter 5.  
5. The last chapter deals with the implications of this thesis for management. 
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Chapter 2 
Systems, Complexity and 
Sensemaking 
This chapter focuses on the three theories that are used in this study to provide a new 
perspective towards interpreting what really transpires in ERP project adoption that leads to 
delays, inflated costs, abandonment of the projects and increased project scope. The theories 
are System Development, Complexity Theory and Sensemaking. The theories provide a 
perspective from which the research question will be answered.  
2.1 Background to System Development 
Information Technology solutions / Information Systems have evolved in recent years to such 
an extent that most of them have become complex in character. The development and 
implementation of Information Systems also improved greatly to match the nature, character 
and the reasons for implementation of such systems in organisations. Systems development 
and implementation methodologies have increased and improved as organisations and IT 
experts could no longer afford to just randomly or in an unstructured manner implement large 
scale systems, especially ERPs without a methodology and technique.  
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The information system development has in itself become complex12,13. There are various 
methodologies, tools and techniques in place that are used in IT projects when developing 
and implementing an information technology system14. All over the world Information 
Technology systems development and implementation follows a methodology as either a 
legal requirement or as best practices. It is essential to note this and briefly discuss the history 
and the current trends in system development and implementation to build up to the next 
chapters that will focus on reviewing implementation of particular information systems – IT 
project/s. It is also worth noting that all Information Technology systems implementation in 
general follows a reputable and at times a prescribed methodology that suits not only the 
environment in which it is implemented but also the business purpose for deploying such a 
system. It is critical to also note at this stage that the organisational and environmental 
context within which systems are developed from conceptualisation, business requirements to 
system development changes over a period of time. Only too often valuable time is lost 
between the moment of identifying the need for a system and the moment this system may be 
deployed – during which time facts, processes, functions pertaining to the need, approach and 
methodology may undergo changes.   
2.1.1 Systems Development Defined 
Systems Development concerns itself with the way in which Information Systems are 
conceived, analysed, designed and implemented. An Information Systems Development 
Methodology is defined as a collection of procedures, techniques, tools and documentation 
aids which will help the system developers in their efforts to implement a new information 
system.15 There are various system development methodologies and all of them to a great 
extent conform to the Systems Development Process. For this reason, a system development 
process is outlined which informs the design of many development methodologies.  
                                                 
12 Akkermans H., Van Helden K. 2002. “Vicious and virtuous cycles in ERP implementation: A case study of  
    interrelations between critical success factors”. European Journal of Information Systems 11 (1):35–46 
13 Xie W, Lee G. 2005. Complexity of Information Systems Development Projects: Conceptualization and  
    Measure development. Journal of Management Information Systems, 22 (1); 45 – 83 
14 Botta-Genoulaz V., Millet RA, Grabot B. 2005. “A survey on the recent research literature on ERP systems”. 
Computers in Industry, 56 (6): 510–522 
15 Avison D, Fitzgerald G. 2006. Information System Development Methodologies, Techniques and Tools, 24 
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2.1.2 Systems Development Process 
The process of Information Systems development is predominantly associated with the 
methodologies applied in that process. The core activities found in a system development 
process are: system analysis, system design, programming, testing, conversion and 
production and maintenance.  
2.1.2.1 Systems Analysis 
It focuses on the analysis of the problem the Information Systems will resolve. This includes 
an analysis of the existing systems. The problems are defined, root causes are identified and 
solutions specified16. The business requirements the information system should meet are also 
defined here. This activity includes a feasibility study and identification of possible 
alternative solutions. The main purpose of this activity is to determine the achievability of the 
Information Systems financially, technically and from an organisation perspective.  
2.1.2.2 Systems Design 
System Design focuses on how the system will fulfil the objectives identified during System 
Analysis. It entails the in-depth understanding of the non-functional requirements. The design 
of the information system determines the overall plan or model of the solution. System 
specifications are detailed to deliver the required functionality – fulfilling the managerial, 
organisational and technical requirements of the system.  
2.1.2.3 Programming 
This activity entails the actual translation of the system specifications into software 
programme code. It can be done by an organisation, the software service provider or the 
developers of the system.  
                                                 
16 Bradley, J. 2008. “Management based critical success factors in the implementation of enterprise resource  
    planning systems”. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 9 (3): 175–200 
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2.1.2.4 Testing 
This is one of the time consuming exercises. Its aim is to ascertain that the system produces 
the desired results. Preparation and availability of test data is essential for the success of this 
activity. A system must undergo three types of testing, namely;  
 Unit testing that tests each program separately to locate and address errors. 
 System testing that tests the functionality of the system. This is done to ascertain 
whether the discreet modules functions together as planned.  
 Acceptance testing which provides the final certification that the system is ready to be 
used in an operational environment by end users.  
Testing of a system usually follows a test plan. 
2.1.2.5 Conversion 
This is the actual implementation/installation, where the change/transformation is made from 
the old system to the new one. System components are integrated in to the user environment. 
There are various strategies for system conversions.  Organisation chooses the strategy that 
suits them best by mitigating identified conversion risks. These strategies include parallel 
strategy where both the old and new systems are run together for a while until the 
functionality of the new system is completely assured. Alternatively, the direct cut-over 
strategy is where the new system replaces the old one entirely at once – a full bang approach. 
The Pilot strategy and the phased approach strategy can also be used.  
Once the system is installed and conversions are completed, the system is regarded as in 
production. At this stage the system is reviewed to determine how well it meets the original 
objectives/specifications. The exercise will also determine the need for revisions or system 
modifications. 
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2.1.3 System Development Methodologies 
There are various system development methodologies available17. System development 
methods are chosen depending on the use and reason for implementing the technology. They 
do not merely reflect the step by step process, but encompasses the philosophy and approach 
as well. Different situations call for different approaches18. System Development 
methodologies had their origin in the mid-1960s when the need for formalisation and 
standardisation of development steps were identified. Changing user needs, evolving client 
priorities, focus on service provision, technological improvements and the need for flexibility 
in system development were all contributed to a need for system development methodologies, 
with each striking a different balance19.  
The development, use and operations of information systems occur within a particular 
environment which comprises components from the external and internal environments of an 
organisation. There are four main categories of System Development methodologies, code 
and fix, serial rigorous, intensive rigorous and Agile20. System Development Life cycle 
(SDLC) is the first methodology to be developed and applied in the 1970s and is regarded as 
the basis of many other methodologies21. Other existing methodologies includes, Agile (Data, 
Model Driven Development, Microsoft Solution Framework and Unified process), Dynamic 
System /Development Method, Enterprise Unified Process, Extreme Programming, ICONIX, 
object Oriented Software, Rational Unified process, ISO/IEC 12207, Scrum and Test Driven 
                                                 
17 Monk E, Wagner P. 2009. Concepts in Enterprise Resource Planning: Third Edition. Course Technology,  
    Cengage Learning 
18 Finney S., Corbett M. 2007. “ERP implementation: A compilation and analysis of critical success factors”.  
    Business Process Management Journal 13(3): 329–347 
19 Dillard J F, Ruchala L, Yuthas K. 2005. “Enterprise resource planning systems: A physical manifestation of  
    administrative evil”. International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 6 (2): 107–127 
20 Scott W A. 2009. Choose the right software for the job. Available 
   www.agiledata.org/essays/differentStrategies.html 
21 Fitzgerald B. 2000. System Development Methodologies: the problem of tenses. Information Technology  
   and People. 13(3): 174 - 185 
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Development amongst others. There are more than 25 distinct system development 
methodologies available22. 
2.2 Complexity Theory 
Organisations are faced with many challenges to which there are many possible solutions, 
with each striking a different balance23. Organisations use Information Technology as one of 
the solutions to the challenges with which they are faced.  De Wit and Meyer assert that, for 
every complex problem, there is a simple solution that is wrong24. The assertion implies that 
complex problems require equally complex solutions, with a solution that is designed in such 
a way that it can manage the relationship and the cause and effect of various parts of a 
system. Are ERP systems evidence of that, aimed at dealing with the complex problems 
brought about by the turbulent environment of the knowledge economy?  It is generally 
accepted that ERP systems are complex systems. Systems complexity can be defined as 
perceived complexity associated with the analysis and design of systems. The interwoven 
nature of problems forces organisations to seek different approaches to resolving those 
problems. One of them is Complexity Theory which is one of the many systems approaches 
organisations have at their disposal to address problems with which they are faced. 
Organisations in pursuit of goal seeking and viability through the increased efficiency and 
efficacy of processes and structures, use systems thinking approach, and Complexity Theory. 
This is true to many organisations that focus on innovation, process improvement and 
competitive edge. Knowledge and the management thereof is the main enabler to achieve 
such organisational focus. Complexity Theory is orientated towards improving organisation 
performance in terms of how well the organisation manages its tasks and responds to changes 
in its environments. It is founded on the premise that there is hidden order in the behaviour of 
complex systems. Many organisations use it as a way to encourage innovative thinking and 
                                                 
22 Avison D, Fitzgerald G. 2006. Information System Development Methodologies, Techniques and Tools, 24 
23 Hall, R. 2002. “Enterprise resource planning systems and organizational change: Transforming work 
organization?” Strategic Change, 11 (5): 263–270 
24 De Wit B, Meyer R. 2001. Strategy Synthesis: resolving strategy paradoxes to create competitive advantage, 
25 
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real time response to change. The fundamental of Complexity Theory is holism and Michael 
Jackson defines it as “a holistic approach that asserts that parts of a system can only be 
understood in terms of their relationships with each other and with the whole”25. The way the 
parts interact is critical to how the whole system works.  
A review of chapter 7 of Michael Jackson’s book brings the following elements of 
Complexity Theory to light;  
 It embraces a holistic approach 
 A process view 
 Focus attention on those aspects of organisation that bothers managers the most  
 Relationship between the parts is inherently important  
 Orientated towards improving an organisation’s performance 
 Constant exchange of information with its environments 
 As an organisation evolves, it co-evolves with the environment 
 Complexity Theory methodology allows an organisation to survive on the edge of 
chaos 
 Order arises spontaneously out of chaos  
 The system exhibits self-similarity 
 Requires complete mind shift by managers to secure business success 
 Understanding of patterns is important 
 
It should be recognised that there are many authors in the field of Complexity Theory and 
each has a different perspective on the subject, emphasising different aspects and so 
generating rather different managerial priorities. Looking at each of the Complexity Theory 
elements above and comparing them to that of an ERP system there is no denying that ERP is 
a profound product of complex problems and Complexity Theory, therefore inherently 
complex in its character. The characteristics are so markedly similar that it is undeniable that 
ERPs were meant to solve complex problems using the same approach and essence of 
                                                 
25 Jackson M C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers, 115. 
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Complexity Theory.  Similar to Complexity Theory advocacy, ERPs complexity only exist at 
the level of the system and not in the parts / modules.  The complexity in ERPs too, results 
from the interaction between the various parts that comprise the system. The dynamics of 
each organisation or environment where ERPs are implemented also adds to the complexity 
of the system at any particular time.  According to Jonathan Rosenhead “there is evidence of 
managerial take-up on complexity as a framework for informing organisational practice”26 
Management have accepted that embracing change and managing differently from the 
conventional methods is what will guarantee survival of their organisations. Organisations 
compete in highly dynamic markets and circumstances and needs to therefore be flexible. 
Smith asserts that Complexity Theory has fallen on fertile grounds, due to globalisation, 
technology, competition, change, speed, complexity and paradoxes27. It is the author’s stance 
that organisations use Complexity Theory not as a result of a conscious decision but that they 
naturally utilise the theory and its methodology because of the complex nature of problems 
and solutions. Phenomena are seen as complex and as having parts that are non–linear in 
interactions. Managing that cause and effect is fundamental. The broader interest and 
implementation of ERPs in many organisation which in itself embraces the elements of 
Complexity Theory, could be a signal that use of Complexity Theory is gaining momentum.  
2.2.1 Holistic Approach within Complexity Theory 
Complexity Theory founded its existence on what Jackson refers to as the failure of 
reductionism.  It therefore advocates a holistic view. Complexity Theory offers the benefit of 
describing how complex systems can generate simple outcomes while looking at the whole 
system and not the parts.  An ERP solution touches an entire organisation and may affect 
nearly every employee in that organisation. It has been built on the same premise of 
Complexity Theory that views the reductionism approach to have failed. The author asserts 
that the consequences of the failure of reductionism are the current challenges that face many 
organisations, with regards to legacy systems that only addressed a particular functional area 
                                                 
26 Rosenhead J. 1998. Complexity Theory and Management Practice.  A paper written by Jonathan  
    Rosenhead. Available:  http://www.human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html 
27 Smith ACT. 2005. Complexity Theory for Organizational Futures Studies. Foresight, 7 (3): 22 - 30 
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of an organisation’s operation and in many instances have no relationship with other systems 
or the relationship is not stable for organisational efficiency. Therefore reductionism could be 
the reason behind the legacy systems, silo mentality and problems organisations are so 
desperately trying to correct in recent years using ERPs. Equal to Complexity Theory, ERPs 
are characterised by various parts that constitute the whole. ERPs’ true ambition is enterprise-
wide impact – the whole. It takes the needs of the entire organisations and provides a single 
integrated software solution that addresses the problems of an entire organisation. In most 
cases organisations that implement ERPs successfully, are viewed as successful.  
2.2.2 A Process View 
The pattern of relationships that determines the behaviour of a system is a crucial element of 
Complexity Theory. The Knowledge Economy brought about turbulence and uncertainty, 
therefore chaos is inherent. Complexity Theory attempts to bring order through a process 
view approach. Likewise, all ERPs are founded, based and configured around the 
understanding of processes in an organisation. Any ERP system pushes a company toward 
full process integration and solves the fragmentation of information28. Each ERP 
implementation project starts with the modelling of the organisation’s processes to 
understand the pattern of relationships within that organisation. It is also an attempt to bring 
order to the chaos that together with self-organising processes, necessitated or pushed 
organisations to decide to implement ERPs.  Michael Jackson states that “order is an 
emergent property of disorder and it comes about through self-organising processes operating 
from within the system itself.29 Whenever an organisation experiences instability, it is forced 
to bring stability. The best and most popular way in recent years is a process approach that 
not only defines end-to-end processes but also entails a holistic approach.  
                                                 
28 Park K, Kusiak K. 2005. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Operations Support Systems for 
    Maintaining Process Integration. International Journal of Production Research, 43 (19); 3959 - 3982 
29 Jackson M C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers, 115.  
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2.2.3 A Problem Focused Approach 
Organisations focus mainly on those aspects with the highest impact, such as stakeholder 
relationship, customer relations, innovation, profit margins, sustainability and process 
optimisation, all rooted in knowledge, its access, retention and re-use.  “Complexity Theory 
focuses attention on those aspects of organisational life that bothers most managers most of 
the time – disorder, irregularity and randomness”.30 Knowledge Economy is characterised by 
turbulence – instability, rapid change, unpredictability, interconnectedness, etc. Therefore, it 
suffices to say that what Michael Jackson refers to (quote above), is in essence the challenges 
brought about by the Knowledge Economy which puts knowledge or information and its 
value at the heart of what organisations do.  
Complexity Theory requires managers to focus and address such challenges. These 
challenges are brought about by the KE, and no matter how broad and high level they seem, 
they affect each and every organisation immensely. Complexity Theory encourages managers 
to learn to live with turbulence by addressing and viewing the turbulences as good change. 
Management of Information and knowledge is one of the elements that allow organisations 
that manifest themselves in all aspects of turbulence to position themselves to address and 
survive in the KE. It has therefore in recent years, become a commodity that can determine 
the success and failure of an organisation depending on how well or poorly it is managed and 
used. As a result management of, as well as access to and security of data/ 
information/knowledge has become an important element in an organisation’s strategies and 
ERPs can address these. Due to many organisations having disparate systems that are not 
integrated, getting to the single version of the truth becomes a daily challenge that, if not 
attended to, degrades organisational efficiency and business performance that are vital for 
survival in this era. Thus, many organisations use ERPs to address these day to day 
challenges because of their capability to span across functional areas, location and focus on 
                                                 
30 Jackson  M C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers. 113. See Also; Prigagine I. 1989.  
   The Philosophy of Instability. Futures, August 1989; 396 – 400, and Stacey R D. 1992. Managing the  
   Unknowable: Strategic Boundaries Between Order and Chaos in Organizations. Jossey-Bass,  
   San Francisco. 43 
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executing business processes across an entire organisation.  It can also be viewed as an 
attempt to bring stability to the inherent chaos. ERPs can collect data from various key 
business processes and store the data in a single central data repository, enabling an 
organisation to access and share information that was fragmented in different systems. ERPs 
also accelerate the communication of information in an organisation making it easier to 
coordinate daily operations.  
2.2.4 The Inherent Importance of Independent Parts 
The interconnected nature of phenomena and problems is apparent in the relationships that 
exist between their parts. The model of integrated problems and integrated solutions is 
evident beyond the Information Technology space. The parts and the interaction between the 
parts is the core to Complexity Theory. ERPs just like Complexity Theory states that the 
impact of the interactions of the parts on the whole can deliver significant results even though 
the interactions can be very minor. As such the relationships between the parts are non- 
linear. Scientifically, to explain something is to link the cause and the effects. ERPs are 
intended to manage the relationship between the various parts of a system in, and for, an 
organisation.  
2.2.5 Performance Improvement Orientation 
Technology related projects have become a common and recurring endeavour in many 
organisations in recent decades and ERP solutions in particular. ERPs are intended to help 
organisations become more flexible and productive by coordinating the business processes 
more closely and integrating groups of processes so they focus on effective management of 
resources and customer service. McAfee details the impact enterprise information technology 
adoption has on operational performance31. One of the main reasons that drive organisations’ 
decisions on ERP or IT projects is to improve operating efficiency as part of the strategy to 
support future growth plans and sustainability. ERP’s best hope – in design, branding and 
                                                 
31 McAfee A. 2002. The Impact of Enterprise Information Technology Adoption on Operational  
    Performance: An Empirical Investigation. Productios and Operations Management, 11 (1); 33 - 53 
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marketing- is to demonstrate its value through improvement of organisation business process 
performance. Similarly, Michael Jackson asserts Complexity Theory to be one of those 
systems thinking approaches that are primarily orientated towards helping goal seeking and 
viability of organisations through increasing the efficiency and efficacy of organisational 
processes and structures32 
2.2.6 Dynamic Information Exchange 
Similar to Complexity Theory assertion, ERP systems have an intimate relationship with their 
environment and constantly exchange information, not to adapt to the information, but to 
respond effectively so that the relationships can be constantly aligned, are meaningful and 
therefore can co-evolve. The information exchanged is unique to each environment and that 
is what brings about dynamism. This is the reason why ERP systems in two organisations can 
never be implemented in the same way.  
2.2.7 As an Organisation Evolves it Co-evolves with the Environment 
Complex systems are characteristically open systems and it is therefore difficult to 
differentiate the system from its environment. There is a continuous flow of information from 
the environment through to the system which is stored for future use, and vice versa. Morel 
and Ramanujam assert that organisations are routinely viewed as dynamic systems of 
adaptation and evolution that contain multiple parts which interact with one another and with 
the environment33. Eventually both the system and its environment co-evolve. This is also 
evident with ERP systems. The ERP systems constantly exchange information with the 
environment and each effects change on the other.  An organisation and an ERP system are 
able to adapt their structures where necessary, in response to the information from its 
environment – self organisation. The system and /or the organisation co-evolve with their 
environment. This brings about the element of flexibility in organisation and also in ERPs 
hence most are customised and not adopted nor implemented as plain vanilla systems. Plain 
                                                 
32 Jackson  M C. 2003. Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers,  2. 
33 Morel B, Ramanujam R. 1999. “Through the looking glass of complexity: The dynamics of organizations  
    as adaptive and evolving systems”. Organization Science, 10: 278–293. 
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vanilla is a term used to refer to the bare minimum of functions that are known to be available 
in an application or system. It is the standard functionality that an application is supplied 
with, which can be further enhanced by customization.  In Knowledge Management 
perspective, this sets the basis for learning and innovation for both organisations and 
individuals. The uncertainty makes learning even more crucial, in particular double loop 
learning in order to respond to the changes in the environment and to the system. 
Organisations are viewed as complex evolving systems, and this also applies to ERP systems 
– all systems.  
2.2.8 Adapt or Die 
The Knowledge Economy is characterised by unprecedented change. The successful 
application of Complexity Theory methodology allows an organisation to cope better on the 
edge of chaos. Organisations welcome disorder as a partner and use instability positively. 
When this happens, underlying stability can be born. The key to organisational survival is to 
make decisions or create rules that are capable of keeping an organisation operating on the 
edge of chaos, according to Stacey34 He believes in this way new possible futures for an 
organisation will emerge. In this era an organisation needs to position itself in a region of 
bounded instability to remain competitive. This releases creativity and mitigates the risk of a 
planned corporate death which arises when organisations seeks stability at all cost at all 
times. Stacey refers to this clear distinction as ordinary and extraordinary management35  He 
says extraordinary management is required if an organisation is to be able to transform itself 
in situations of open ended change. The author’s position is that the decision by many 
organisations to implement ERPs in the wave of rapid change is an attempt by organisations 
to operate as extraordinary managers as this will position and enable the organisation to cope 
with immanent change that exist in this turbulent world.  Analysis is a key element of 
extraordinary management. ERPs provide fundamental data - and can also be a tool required 
                                                 
34 Burnes B. 2005. Complexity theories and organisational change. International journal of management. 
    review, 7(2): 75 
35 Rosenhead J. 1998. Complexity Theory and Management Practice. 1998. A paper written by Jonathan  
    Rosenhead. Available: http://www.human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html 
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for this analysis, which will help an organisation to respond effectively to each change for 
long term survival.  
2.2.9 Orderly Disorder 
Order arises spontaneously out of chaos. With every chaos a hidden order may be concealed. 
In the midst of disorderliness there is an underlying pattern that needs to be understood. 
“From a complexity perspective, chaos describes a complex, unpredictable, and orderly 
disorder in which pattern of behaviour unfolds in regular but similar forms”36. Complex 
systems such as ERPs have large numbers of independent and yet interacting parts and actors. 
There are two fundamentals evident with ERPs, that at any given time the interactions put an 
organisation on the edge of chaos and that with each ERP implementation there is a stage 
where chaos is inevitable and that is usually followed by system stability which results with 
the system being successfully implemented. In many implementations of complex systems 
like ERP, there is much uncertainty as to what could have or has caused the instability or 
chaos. There will be at any given time a number of reasons that are thought to be the cause 
though without certainty. That edge of chaos during or just after ERP implementation is 
usually spontaneous in many instances followed by stability or order. The continuous 
interactions between the parts and the actors put the organisation and the system continuously 
on the edge of chaos. The benefit is that, this is the general belief that creativity, growth and 
useful self-organisation are at their optimum when complex systems operate on the edge of 
chaos. This could be the cause of the spontaneous order. There are patterns of self-
organisation that occur from the turbulences of systemic interactions.  
2.2.10 System Self-Similarity 
Within a complex system the properties of the various parts are similar in shape to the whole.  
Self-similarity is also an important aspect of the design of many computer systems. As such 
ERP also is characterised by self-similarity. The parts that make up the whole are intrinsically 
                                                 
36 Burnes B. 2005. Complexity theories and organisational change. International journal of management. 
    Review, 7(2): 79 
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similar and this could be the reason why underneath every chaos there is an underlying 
stability. 
2.2.11 Metanoia Secures Success 
Complexity Theory requires complete mind shift by managers to secure business success. 
The word metanoia means fundamental change in character or to change one’s mind or 
purpose. Conventional methods in many ways do not suffice any more in today’s world 
which is characterised by rapid change, intense knowledge requirements and advancement of 
technology. In order to remain competitive, viable and sustainable, managers in organisations 
are forced to approach management differently. A complete mind shift is required. Stacey 
refers to this as a strategic choice organisations have to, and do, make – a transformational 
process where organisations adapt to environmental changes by restructuring themselves in 
an intentional and rational manner37. The complexity of many things around, the 
interconnectedness of phenomena and parts requires a different thinking to the traditional 
method, a thinking that embraces and responds to change. There are various concepts and 
fields of study that justify this, i.e. creativity, innovation, change management, customer 
relations management, stakeholder management and business process management. 
Embracing and accepting these concepts may prove that a manager is on the path towards 
benefiting from using Complexity Theory to tackle organisational problems. In essence there 
is a greater diversity of problems managers are faced with and that need to be adequately 
tackled for organisations to survive. As a result, managers have sought assistance from 
advisers and consultants to help manage their organisations or to steer them to success.  
Complexity Theory also requires managers not only to embrace change but to understand that 
the future of the organisations they manage is largely uncertain. Hence a need to be flexible 
when new information from the environment appears that needs a change in direction. The 
                                                 
37 Stacey R. 1995. “The science of complexity: An alternative perspective for strategic change processes”.    
   Strategic Management Journal, 16 (6): 477-495.  
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problems and practices of ordinary management have been repeatedly addressed in 
management texts. What is innovatory is the concept of extraordinary management. 
Extraordinary management requires the activation of the tacit knowledge and creativity 
available within the organisation. This necessitates the encouragement of informal structures 
– for example, workshops on particular issues or processes, with membership drawn from 
different business units, functions, and levels. Formation of these groups should be 
essentially spontaneous, provoked by paradoxes, anomalies and conflicts thrown up in the 
process of normal management. They need to be self-organising, capable of redefining or 
extending their remit rather than being bound by fixed terms of reference. 
2.2.12 Understanding Patterns 
A system is recurrent and displays a pattern. ERPs also demonstrate a pattern and are 
therefore fundamentally stable. System Thinking generally argues that one must see beyond 
the clutter on the surface to see the underlying regularities.  In the midst of the apparent 
complexity and chaos, there is an underlying pattern of stability that if understood makes 
managing the changes possible – this applies equally to ERP systems. This is the only way 
managers are able to determine what the future may hold for the organisations. Given that the 
key finding claimed for Complexity Theory is the effective uncertainty of the future, the 
common assumption among managers that part of their job is to decide where the 
organisation is going, and to take decisions designed to get it there is, seen as a dangerous 
delusion. Management, afflicted by increasing complexity and information overload, can 
react by becoming quite intolerant towards ambiguity. Factors, targets, organisational 
structures all need to be clearly identified. The management task is seen to be the enunciation 
of mission, the determination of strategy, and the elimination of deviation in the midst of 
uncertainty.  As a result, the complexity in the KE era and the interrelatedness of phenomena 
has elevated the importance of history. Understanding history is now critical in the complex 
system and it is one of the elements that bestow the capacity to act.  
 One of the best and common ways to predict and cope with the complex environment is to 
understand the pattern which is historical. ERPs are the foundation to effective information 
management, business intelligence, data management, etc. The knowledge technologies such 
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as artificial intelligence are tools that organisations use to derive patterns out of the historical 
data. The tools operate on the sense of complexity.  Knowledge embedded in ERPs is 
therefore used. The best and common way to predict and cope in the complex environment is 
to understand the pattern. The concept of using data to improve business performance and 
decision making evolved.  Information Technology projects are naturally characterised by 
uncertainty, and so are many things in today’s life. The main question to ask is, are 
organisations aware that they use complexity theory to address their problem or is it simply 
implicitly used because of the complexity in the environment and problems? Pascal Van Eck 
and Maria Laura Ponisio38 assert that IT projects are complex systems that consists of 
different kinds of components and also that project outcome is governed by the dynamics of a 
complex system which IT project management aims to control. Complexity exists 
everywhere. Complexity is present in all the aspects that directly and indirectly impact on an 
IT project itself, the solution it aims to implement, the problems that the solution and the 
project aims to address, the management of and the outcome of such project. The dynamics 
of any complex system arises from the interactions of the components of that system. 
Complexity Theory is often an unconscious or an obvious choice for many organisations 
because it embraces complexity and encourages organisations to accept diversity as a good 
change and challenge. 
2.3 Sensemaking 
IT projects in general are infested with challenges that originate from the changes that happen 
around them and the complexities and dynamism that result from the interaction of various 
complex systems that form part of the IT project and its environment.  So many questions 
arise when thinking about complexities that exist in the IT solution project management 
environment, the internal and external organisational environment in relation to what 
constitute an IT project success. Some of these questions are: how do organisations make 
                                                 
38 Van Eck P, Ponisio M L. 2008. IT Project Management from a Systems Thinking Perspective. A Position   
    Paper. eProceedings of the 3rd International Research Workshop on Information Technology Project   
    Management. Paris, France, 12th – 13th December 2008.  
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sense in the age of rapid change that lasts beyond momentary?  Is it possible to make sense 
where there is complexity? Because when one is making sense of an occurrence, other 
changes and turbulences take place and render the sense being made irrelevant in the wake of 
newer changes that too require sensemaking. When and how do organisations make sense of 
the IT solution itself and how it should function? How do organisations make sense of what 
they are doing before they see the outcome? Do organisations make decisions with huge 
implications without making sense of the reality - actual solution/decision?  Sensemaking 
plays a crucial role in complexity and is one of the backbones or cores of understanding the 
meaning brought about by the complexity organisations are trying to address. In order to 
address the changes, sense (Sensemaking) must be made of those changes to have the right or 
appropriate response. The study focuses on the Sensemaking process, where, when and how 
it takes place in an organisation in relation to ERP projects, from decision making to 
implementation. This is an attempt to answer some of the questions raised above. The 
Knowledge Economy and the challenges brought about by it contributes largely to the need 
and demand for organisations to have IT - ERP systems implemented. It is discussed in the 
previous sections that ERPs are in themselves complex systems, that information is one of the 
main drivers in today’s economy, and managing it successfully is crucial for organisations to 
survive. As a result organisations are using IT to manage information and information to 
manage and implement IT.  
The evaluation of IT projects also needs to be equally complex in order to address all the 
factors organisations are faced with internally and externally when implementing such 
solutions.  Besides the fact that in most cases, there is considerable uncertainty about what to 
evaluate in information systems projects39, it is also becoming clear that the decision on how 
ERP systems should work when implemented, becomes apparent only during and after 
implementation, when continuous Sensemaking takes place, necessitated by the changes and 
the interaction between components that constitutes a system in an ERP project and the 
environmental factors. The position of the author is that Sensemaking processes take place 
                                                 
39Alderman N, Ivory C, McLoughlin I, Vaughan R. 2005. “Sense-making as a process within complex service- 
led projects”. International Journal of Project Managent, 23(5):380–5 
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continuously, from decision making until the completion of the project. It therefore suffices 
to say that Sensemaking is an essential process that advances Complexity Theory by making 
sense of the changes and environmental influences. The continuous Sensemaking is 
necessitated by the various changes, new information and interactions at various stages in the 
project life cycle that continuously emerge so that the organisation can align and be relevant 
to its environment at all times. It can also be assumed that an organisation whose ERP 
projects failed to the stage of abandonment either failed to continuously make sense as and 
when the changes occurred, or responded incorrectly to the changes, or choose the wrong 
options from the many that are presented by new information as the changes occur, that 
eventually it could not keep up with not only what it is doing but also what the environments 
requires it to do. From a Systems Thinking perspective, the feedback loop mechanism did not 
function efficiently or not at all.  
2.3.1 What is Sensemaking? 
There are many definitions of Sensemaking in the literature40,41,42. Weick defines 
Sensemaking as follows: ‘Sensemaking involves placing stimuli into some kind of 
framework’.  When a stimulus is put into framework, it enables people to comprehend, 
understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate and predict. He also provides a definition of 
Sensemaking as a thinking process that uses retrospective accounts to explain surprises43. 
Both definitions will be used in this study as the author’s view is that they complement and 
do not contradict each other. The latter definition focuses on what is done in Sensemaking   
whereas the former focuses on how Sensemaking takes place. Using both definitions, 
Sensemaking is using retrospective accounts to explain what is not understood by putting 
stimuli (information, sense, deduction or interpretation of the retrospective account) in to a 
framework that shapes what is thought to be, needs to be, or should be. The definition implies 
                                                 
40 Edited by Hernes T,  Maitilis  S. Process, Sensemaking, and Organisaing. Oxford: Oxford  University Press. 
2010. 
41 Harris S. G. 1994. “Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking: A Schema-Based Perspective”.  
   Organization Science, 5(3):309-321. 
42 Klein G, Moon B, Hoffman R R. 2006. “Making Sense of Sensemaking 2: A Macrocognitive Model”. IEEE  
    Intelligent Systems, 21(5): 88-92 
43 Weick K. E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organisations, 4. 
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that at the time of decision making, planning and actioning, the circumstances, information 
and the frameworks are different, the people engaged at this levels are also not the same and 
that result in different outcomes both conceptually and practically for the same matter. A 
framework or a frame of reference and cues are pre-requisite for sensemaking. A frame is a 
generalised point of view that directs interpretation. Cues are familiar structures which are 
seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be going on. Even though 
Sensemaking originates at an individual level, the focus in this study is on how Sensemaking 
takes place in an organisation and relates it to complexity and IT projects. It involves the on-
going retrospective development of plausible images that rationalise what people are doing. It 
is therefore a critical organisational activity.  
2.3.2 Characteristics of Sensemaking 
Weick provides seven main characteristics of Sensemaking44. They are Identity construction, 
Retrospective, Enactive of sensible environments, Social, Ongoing, Focus on and by 
extracted cues and Plausibility rather than accuracy. These properties are used whenever 
Sensemaking takes place. As indicated earlier Sensemaking takes place at all the stages in the 
ERP implementation project by various people using all the properties of Sensemaking. 
These people operate at various levels and use different cues to arrive at a meaning. 
Sensemaking as a process unfolds as a sequence in which people concerned with identity in 
the social context of other actors engage on-going circumstances from which they extract 
cues and make plausible sense retrospectively45. The statement sums up most of the elements 
that are characters of Sensemaking. Each property will be described in relation to at least one 
element/area where it is applied in an ERP implementation project life circle.  
2.3.2.1 Identity Construction 
Sensemaking is grounded in identity construction. When an organisation makes sense and 
choices it is doing so to construct and maintain a particular identity about itself. When doing 
                                                 
44 Weick K E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organisations, 17 
45 Weick K E, Sutcliffe K M, Obstfeld D. 2005. Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking. Organizing  
    Science, 16 (4): 409 - 421 
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so, cues that support the preferred identity are used to arrive at a meaning. Organisations 
continuously interact with the environment and what organisations are (identity), and what 
the environment is, is the result of the interactions and the choices made. Consequently the 
decisions that organisations make are also driven by a sense of self identity and self-efficacy 
as an organisation’s response to its environment. Choices and decisions are made not only 
because they are right but also because they fit the frame and are supported by cues.  
Sensemaking is central because it is the primary site where meanings materialize that informs 
and constrain identity and action. When a particular ERP solution has constantly been 
unsuccessfully implemented by various organisations, it produces a cue of poor identity. 
Therefore, organisations will not opt for that solution, while there may be nothing wrong with 
the product itself but rather with the implementation thereof.  Organisations build their own 
brand informed by the phenomenon they perceive and the cues they derive from the 
environment to support their decisions and/or branding. What is worth noting is that identity 
in an organisation is not the same throughout all the organisational levels. The cues that 
inform the identity for executives, planners and operations staff are not the same and cannot 
be the same. Therefore there is already an incongruity of identity for the same elements in the 
same organisation for various groups.  
2.3.2.2 Retrospective Construction  
From a Sensemaking perspective, retrospective construction of meaning refers to using 
previous experiences to explain current changes or surprises. To perceive an outcome 
organisations have to look backwards and find cues to explain the current and predict the 
future or determine what needs to be done. Since there are many people involved in 
Sensemaking in an IT project, it means that there are many cues that are used to explain the 
same phenomena with different frames. The current context of a phenomenon affects how 
organisations and individuals look back and determine the meaning. History is important and 
it is used to explain things in this world of uncertainty where continuous prediction is 
required. Beside the point that history provides previous facts, the same way it does for 
complexity, for Sensemaking it provides cues that can be used to not only understand what is 
happening now but also what may happen in the future, thereby bringing an element of 
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expectations which reduces complexity or surprises. Complexity Theory also supports history 
as that brings pattern and a sense of stability, ERPs are implemented in order to have 
historical data and be able to use it for projections and predictions bringing stability and 
capacity to act – all these are similar to the aims of Knowledge Management.  History is also 
used to justify the choices organisations make in decision making, highlighting positives of 
the choices and negatives of available options not chosen.  A decision why a particular ERP 
solution was opted for over another will be justified using history and retrospective 
experiences available that are fitted in to the current framework, i.e.  an organisation needs an 
ERP that will address the challenges identified and which was successfully implemented 
somewhere else.  
2.3.2.3 Environmental Interactions  
Organisations are not separate from their environment, their actions are reflected in the 
environment. In the same way that organisations and IT projects get complexities, turbulence 
and information load from the environment, they also contribute these in turn to the 
environment. The actions made in relation to a complex IT project contribute back to the 
environment. The crux of this is that in any organisation where the employees are constituted 
at various levels and groups what is sensed and used from the environment is different for the 
same phenomenon. The outcome of all implemented projects, failed or successful, contributes 
to what constitutes and is contained in the environment. With reference to Figure 1 (Page 4), 
which shows that KM is at the heart of the interactions between an organisation and its 
environment, it therefore suffices to say that what an organisation does regarding ERP 
projects, underlying reasons for implementing those and Sensemaking regarding that, directly 
or indirectly impact the KM realities of that organisation. Even though organisations may not 
think about it, the inherent relations that exist between the environment and the organisation, 
the challenges posed by the KE, all centres around KM and managing the challenges brought 
about by the KE, knowingly and unknowingly. An organisation when deciding on an ERP 
solution and by choosing a specific ERP product, it is defining andchoosing to confront and 
to compete in the ERP/ IT project environment. The outcome of each project or ERP 
implementation contributes to that environment and other organisations will use that outcome 
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as cues to justify their decisions or choices in the future. It also equally becomes part of 
history.  
2.3.2.4 Social Context 
Social context cannot be separated from organisations because they are constituted by 
individuals. People are not required to have the same meaning in organisations but rather 
alignment to a meaning. Sensemaking in an organisation is crucial for getting a collective 
action, implementation of ERP system, in order to succeed or move forward.  There are 
various groups within an organisation, executive management, operations management, 
functional grouping and specialists who can easily align to meaning but not so easily across 
the groups because their social context is inherently different.  
2.3.2.5 On-going 
Sensemaking is on-going in character.  It involves the on-going retrospective developments 
of plausible images. This means that since complexity exists throughout the life of an ERP 
project, continuous Sensemaking is required to get meaning, and to respond accordingly, 
from the beginning of the project until completion.  Therefore there are various meanings 
attached to the same phenomenon at various levels and points in the ERP project life. The 
challenge is that, the various and fragmented meanings derived from a change needs to be 
aligned from an organisational context in order to enable pursuit of a common goal.  
Therefore holding one meaning for various levels and groups in an organisation can only last 
for a short period of time, when change or disruptions occurs at any level, the shared meaning 
is lost. Even with its on-going nature, Sensemaking is subtle, swift, social and takes place 
without conscious intention.  
2.3.2.6 Focused on and by Enacted Cues 
The enacted cues for various levels in the organisations are different, i.e. the cues that 
management uses and that are used by operational personnel are different for the same 
phenomenon. What is often considered positive by management may be regarded negatively 
by those not in the same level. This is also supported by Weick who argues that commitment, 
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capacity and expectations affect sensemaking during crisis and severity of the crisis itself46. 
This distorts the shared meaning and alignment at various stages in the ERP project life 
because the cues and the ratification of those cues are different for various levels and stages 
in a particular project and in an organisation.  
2.3.2.7 Plausibility versus Accuracy  
ERP projects are driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. In this world of fast paced 
change, multiple meaning, diversity and information overload, it is difficult to be accurate at 
all times. Sensemaking is characterised by acceptance of ‘good enough’. It also advocates the 
fact that it is not possible to maintain a consistent level of perfection but acceptance of 
whatever satisfies the need in order to move forward. ERP projects are equally like that 
especially at the implementation stage when various possibilities present themselves and the 
planned activity proves to be inadequate or incorrect. At this point whatever satisfies the need 
of the organisation will be acceptable.  When Sensemaking takes place it means something 
new, something unknown happens and it intrigues or stimulate one to seek meaning. When 
implementing an ERP and in the course of stability something unexpected usually happens, 
i.e. the modules or parts may not be talking to each other as planned and expected, 
Sensemaking, is triggered as the unexpected has disrupted the stability. Sensemaking is the 
human cognitive process that takes the unknown and structures it to make it known.  
2.3.2 Sensemaking in Organisations and ERP Adoption 
There exist in the world today a fast pace or weave of change and as these changes affects 
organisations, they need to effectively respond to them. Sensemaking therefore becomes an 
indispensable on-going exercise that seeks to find meaning to the changes/surprises. Mattlis 
states ‘the basic idea of Sensemaking is that, reality is an on-going accomplishment that 
                                                 
46 Weick K E. 1988. Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations. Journal of Management Studies, 25 (4); 305 
    – 317. See Also; Smircich L, Stubbart C. 1985. Strategic Management in an Enacted World. Academy of  
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emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs’47.   
Sensemaking is a process that seeks to structure the unknown. Firstly, there are three main 
elements that environmentally determine when Sensemaking should take place: information 
overload, complexity and turbulence. All three are the drivers of Knowledge Management in 
organisations and are also the same elements that affect the direction of ERP projects before 
and during implementation. Turbulence, complexity and information overload bring about 
uncertainty and ambiguity in organisations the same way that they affect ERP projects. 
According to Weick48, when and where there is information overload, the quantity of diverse 
information that people need to process is high and that result in ambiguity. Where and when 
there is complexity, there is increased perceived uncertainty because of the diverse elements 
that interact in many ways, and lastly where and when there is turbulence there is instability 
due to the frequency and the randomness of change.  Therefore, the author’s view is that 
Sensemaking is also an attempt by organisations to understand and deal with uncertainty, 
instability and ambiguity, the same reasons that see ERPs implemented in organisations to 
increase an organisation’s capability to deal with that.  
As already stated, ERPs or IT projects are inherently complex and are implemented in 
organisations that are faced with challenges brought about by the Knowledge Economy, 
therefore it suffices to say, the same challenges manifest themselves in every aspect of an 
organisation’s life that each action and decision an organisation makes from IT to general 
management and operational activities is aimed at addressing the same challenges. 
Organisations are in constant pursuit of stability while the environment brings about changes 
that disrupt a pattern. It can be argued therefore that in the KE era, Sensemaking becomes 
significant to also seek and provide meaning to the phenomena so organisations are able to 
understand, interpret and decide on what needs to be done. The definitions of Sensemaking 
discussed earlier on imply that, when disruptions happen, Sensemaking takes place and also 
that real sense is made after an action. Sensemaking takes place when people in an 
                                                 
47 Mattlis S. 2005. The Social Process of Organizational Sensemaking. Academy of Management Journal, 48 
(1): 21 - 49 
48 Weick K E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organisations,  87 
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organisation confront surprising changes. In essence organisations are constantly and 
continuously challenged. This makes Sensemaking an on-going and continuous process in 
organisations. The words continuous and on-going are used simultaneously to echo that it is 
on-going so that changes or disruptions can be addressed and also continuous because a 
disruption or change can continuously be addressed at various levels of an organisation. A 
phenomenon can receive Sensemaking attention at various levels of an organisation resulting 
in different meaning to the same phenomenon by different people and at different times 
which adds to the complexity with which an organisation is constantly faced with. The 
author’s stance is that this could be the reason why organisations are facing challenges with 
implementation of ERPs or complex IT solutions in general. Different people assign different 
stimuli to different frameworks within the same organisation on the same change or 
disruption that inherently results in even more chaos than that brought about by the change 
itself. The 7 properties of Sensemaking are applied at all three levels in an organisation in 
relation to ERP adoption; the strategic level, planning stage and implementation or execution 
stage. The above is also supported by Snowden with his concept of multi-ontological nature 
of Sensemaking49. In light of the above, a closer look at the Sensemaking property, 
retrospect, as an example, implies that at every level those involved only make sense of their 
actions after the act. Action is a precondition for Sensemaking. Throughout the organisation 
regardless of level, people are not sure of what they are doing until they have done it because 
the element of certainty is never there until after the act. It follows therefore that, 
Sensemaking precedes decision making and also follows it. 
During and before action, real Sensemaking occurs with different cues, frames and context. If 
this is the case, why do organisations review project success based on the original plan – 
scope, budget and timelines? The cues, frames and the context used to determine the costs, 
timelines and the scope are different from those in use during planning and implementation. 
Why do we want to measure IT project success based on what we knew and required then, 
which is different from what is known after implementation and arguably what is now 
                                                 
49 Snowden D J. 2005. Multi-Ontology Sensemaking: A New Simplicity in Decision Making. Informatics in 
Primary Care, 13 (1); 45 - 53 
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ascertained to be the requirements? Furthermore Sensemaking of the same phenomenon at 
various stages yields totally different results. Shouldn’t project success therefore be 
determined for each stage and groups of stakeholders, since it will hold different meaning for 
each group? Also the environmental factors that affect each level are different resulting in 
different cues and frames for each level, therefore the enactive of sensible environments in 
the stages will be different. Strategists are able to pull out the cues and put them in to frames 
quicker than at any other level because the required information and frames load are less 
therefore manageable and understanding of complexity at a higher or different level, whilst 
this is not the case with other levels. At the planning stage information, frames load and 
requirements increases compared to the strategic stage. The pool of people involved at this 
stage increases too. The implementation stage has a bigger pool of people involved, whilst 
the complexity is vastly different to the other stages, the information load and requirement is 
higher with the corresponding amount of frames and cues to match. Even though there is 
more information available at this stage, however the need is for specific information in this 
pool. Thus the information requirements shift from low (at strategy level) to higher at the 
implementation level. The need for specific information in the large pool of information at 
the implementation level is predominant whilst at strategic level, general information is 
sufficient. Another critical character of the implementation level is that those involved are 
driven and need satisfaction more than “good enough’ as it is the case with the strategic level. 
The confusion or chaos is greater at the implementation stage because of the search for 
specific meaning in the weave of multiple meaning and ambiguity. It is at this stage that the 
likelihood for organisations being on the edge of chaos is greater because at implementation 
stage there is a greater need for specific information and the need to accurately respond to the 
environmental changes that exist. Lack of alignment across the three main levels can also be 
attributed to be due to the communication gap across them. 
 There are different complex systems at play in each level, i.e. at the strategic level, the 
political and financial systems influences the frame and the information/facts and eventually 
the decision made. The intensity of knowledge of those involved at these levels is also 
different. The implementation stage requires intense and specific knowledge whereas at the 
strategic level the knowledge required is high level and generic or broad in nature. 
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Complexity is intense at the implementation level and if not properly managed and change 
efficiently resounded, has the potential to render the project to fail, thereby contributing to an 
organisation being on the edge of chaos from a Complexity Theory perspective. Other 
constituents of an organisation that have an impact on Sensemaking are the people – actual 
users of the system, culture of the organisation, stakeholders and the importance of change 
management should not be underestimated.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Implementation of ERP systems follows system development methodologies that standardise 
and quality assure the implementation. Complexity Theory and ERPs are established on 
similar foundations – to address complexity. In order to address the complexity adequately 
and correctly, sense needs to be made of the changes. Sensemaking plays a crucial role in 
understanding, managing and coping with complexity.  
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Chapter 3 
The Case of Programme 
Phakama 
This chapter focuses on and details the conceptualisation, planning, developments and 
activities of Programme Phakama. It is a City of Johannesburg project that implemented the 
ERP solution. Programme Phakama is used as a case study for this research to enable a close-
up view of an ERP implementation project in a local government context and to apply 
sensemaking, complexity and system development theories.   
3.1 The City of Johannesburg 
The City of Johannesburg is one of the six Metropolitan Municipalities in South Africa. It is 
located in Gauteng province, serving the economic hub of South Africa. It is mandated to 
provide basic services to its customers and residents. Historically the City of Johannesburg 
was founded in the 1800s as a mining camp after gold was discovered. The City evolved 
through the years to become the dynamic and progressive city it is today. Due to its 
economic, political and social history, it comes across as a unique institution. This City faces 
different problems in comparison to comparable cities countrywide due to its history, 
location, its clients and other inherent characteristics of its environment, serving a number of 
corporate clients that impact on local and national economy. It is therefore forced to be at the 
top of its game at all times. It faces all the realities brought about by the Knowledge 
Economy albeit being the last domain of the public service. The CoJ as a result developed 
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into a vibrant, result driven, dynamic and successful organisation that has crafted innovative 
solutions ahead of other cities at all times. It has over the years developed a vision to make 
Johannesburg a World Class African City. In order to achieve this, it has embarked on a 
mission for sustainable economic growth which will ensure better life for all. The CoJ has in 
the past embarked on various transformation processes with its strategy in full sight. 
Therefore Programme Phakama came about as a continuation of the transformation journey 
by the City which began as a key objective of the iGoli 2002 strategy50 
3.2 Conceptualisation of Programme Phakama 
The iGoli 2002 strategy brought about the most fundamental change to the City’s business 
model, in particular the establishment of UACs (Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised 
Entities), which were seen as key drivers for restoring and sustaining financial stability to the 
City. However, since the implementation of iGoli 2002, there have been several changes 
impacting on the City’s business model, such as the promulgation of the Municipal Systems 
Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act. The Municipal Systems Act requires 
significant changes in the relationship between citizens and municipalities.  It is required that 
service delivery be orientated towards the needs of the community and the Municipalities to 
be citizen focused. The Act also requires the Municipalities (City of Johannesburg) to 
“…organize its administration in a manner that would enable the municipality to be 
responsive to the needs of the community”.51  The CoJ is a very large, complex, and 
diversified organisation with over three (3) million customers and a diverse residence type. In 
order to maintain its leadership status, the City has established a vision of a governance that 
is innovative and proactive, embracing information technology and dynamic structures to 
leapfrog to higher levels of efficiency in service delivery.  
                                                 
50 City of Johannesburg. 2002. iGoli 2002 Plan.  iGoli 2002 is a three years transformation project by the City of 
Johannesburg. Its main aim was to restore the financial health of the City and structural transformation. It 
sought to reduce fragmentation, eliminate duplication, improve accountability and ensure a cost effective 
service delivery. 18 
51 South Africa. 2000. Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 2000, Chapter 7, Section 51,  (a)              
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This vision demands support systems that provide information expediently to managers for 
improved decision-making, accountability, and control. Programme Phakama was therefore 
born based on recognition of the above and the need to bring about a solution to the 
challenges. The need to improve service delivery through improved customer relationship 
management and to develop a sustainable revenue base through improved billing and revenue 
management with an integrated approach to service delivery emerged and could not be 
overlooked by the City. This brought about the conceptualisation of Programme Phakama in 
2006. The primary mandate of the project is to re-design business processes and implement 
an integrated IT solution for the entire customer relations and revenue management functions/ 
value chains across the City.52 The integrated IT solution is the Enterprise Resource Planning 
system for the customer service and revenue management main streams of the City. The 
Programme Phakama Blueprint was then developed, which contains models guiding how the 
system should be implemented for and support the customer relations management and 
revenue management in the City and its entities.  
The City reviewed the whole issue of accessibility to service, as part of its broader service 
delivery improvement thrust. In the past, points of access have been complex, fragmented and 
confusing. Currently, the City is falling short of providing integrated access to its citizens in 
line with the Batho Pele principles and the notion of integrated government. In particular, the 
creation of a mixed service delivery model has also made it difficult for citizens to view and 
experience the City in an integrated manner53. The Municipal Finance Management Act holds 
the Accounting Officer of a municipality responsible for the management of the revenue of 
the municipality. Under the current model accountability for revenue management is 
fragmented across the CoJ Revenue Management Unit and the Utilities. It is clear that the 
City has to deal with the considerable fragmentation in respect of procedures and information 
systems for revenue and customer interface.  It is also clear that this leads to the opportunity 
for business units and departments of the CoJ to escape single point accountability.  The need 
for change was inevitable in order to improve the situation with regards to accountability.  
                                                 
52 City of Johannesburg. 2005. Programmed Phakama Blueprint Executive Summary, 4 
53 City of Johannesburg. 2005. Programmed Phakama Blueprint Executive Summary, 6 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 41 
 
This need was also highlighted by the increasing public concern around the management of 
customer service, the delivery of services, and billing and revenue collection processes. The 
fundamental change and recommendation of this blueprint is that the Revenue and Customer 
Interface Value Chain (CIVC) should be seen as a core function of the CoJ and be developed 
into a broader service utility; essential to the sound financial status of the City allowing it to 
provide its customers with a first class service. In May 2005 the Mayoral Committee 
approved the establishment of a single Revenue Management Value Chain and single 
Customer Interface Value Chain supported by an integrated IT system which Programme 
Phakama is to implement54 The problems identified above and the project described below 
exhibits all the characteristics of complexity in that, the link between the parts are not linear 
and simple solutions cannot solve the problem. In what follows, the author extensively makes 
use of and quotes the following Project sources of the CoJ;  
 Revenue Management Value Chain Operating Model document 
 Customer Interface Value Chain Operating Model  
 Value chains Operating Model  
 Mayoral Committee Meeting Resolutions   
 Presentation of programme Phakama to the Mayoral Committee 
 Programme Phakama Blueprint  
 Programme Phakama Implementation Approach  
 Jo-serve Business Model Principles 
3.3 The Scope and Deliverables of Programme Phakama 
The scope of the Programme as indicated in the Blueprint report includes the following55;  
                                                 
54 City of Johannesburg. 2005. Mayoral Committee meeting resolutions, May 2005 
55 City of Johannesburg. 2005. Programme Phakama Value Chains Operating Models, 14 
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3.3.1 Revenue Management Value Chain 
The approach the CoJ has taken in scoping the revenue management value chain indicated an 
understanding and acknowledgement of the significance of this value chain from a customer 
perspective. It is a value chain that has the inherent potential, if it fails, to cripple the City 
financially, which has happened in the earlier years when the City experienced billing and 
revenue collection problems and was under financial strain. This was in essence a risk 
mitigating action by the City to prevent the re-occurrence of the aforementioned. The original 
scope of the Revenue Management Value Chain (RMVC) is focused and limited to the design 
and implementation of an end-to-end CoJ Revenue Management Value Chain across the 
proposed CoJ’s organisational boundaries of UACs, JoServe and CoJ.  
The scope of the value chain is defined on two levels, viz.: 
Organisational: 
 City Power; 
 Johannesburg Water; and 
 PIKITUP 
 CoJ Revenue Department; 
 Rates & Taxes; 
 Related CoJ functions / directorates; 
i. GIS 
ii. Property valuations 
iii. Town Planning 
Functional: 
 All core revenue and related revenue processes within the above-mentioned utilities/ 
department/ functions are responsible for the following sources of revenue: 
i. Consumption based utility services: electricity, water, refuse, sewerage 
ii. Availability charges: electricity, water, refuse 
iii. Property rates and taxes 
iv. Sundry billing items that are stand related 
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Revenue sources such as libraries, traffic fines and others that are not generated in the CoJ 
Revenue Department, City Power, Johannesburg Water, Pikitup and the Rates and Taxes unit 
were not to form part of the scope of the revenue management value chain. 56 
3.3.1.1 Revenue Management Value Chain Deliverables 
The main focus of this value chain is to ensure that the right customer is correctly billed, the 
bill delivered and the billed amount collected from the customer. By definition, the main 
purpose of the Revenue Management Value Chain (RMVC) is to ensure that all monthly 
billable services rendered are expanded in use, billed and the relevant income recovered. This 
also includes upstream and downstream dependencies to ensure efficient and complete 
service delivery. This specifically excludes the supply of technical services and the associated 
financial aspects thereof. It is clear from this description that many dependencies exist 
between the RMVC, the CIVC and the other CoJ and UAC competencies. These 
dependencies are even more significant when considering that JoServe will perform most of 
the RMVC activities and as such effective service arrangements between JoServe, UACs and 
CoJ will be critical to ensure the success of JoServe. The impact of JoServe on Rates & Taxes 
is significant as the entire billing and collections activities, including administering of 
customer accounts will now be performed by JoServe and will to a great degree also be 
automated through SAP. However, the core focus for the Rates & Taxes department will be 
on Revenue Planning and as such, the current organisational structure of Rates & Taxes 
reporting to the Executive Director: Finance and Economic Development will remain. In the 
case of the UACs, JoServe will now perform the entire billing and collection activities except 
Meter Reading. This business model will give enough control to the Power and Water 
utilities on their revenue without compromising the Phakama main objective of an integrated 
Revenue Value Chain for the city of Johannesburg. The UACs will be accountable for the 
water and power components of the bill, whilst JoServe will be accountable for the other 
components. As the RMVC activities performed by JoServe are mostly back office in nature, 
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there are also several touch points between the RMVC and CIVC. These are mainly revenue 
related customer queries that cannot be resolved by the front office CIVC staff, cash 
collections and credit management in the form of clearances.57 
3.3.2 Customer Interface Value Chain 
The City’s approach to this value chain reflected the understanding that this value chain is the 
face of the City. The undisputed dilemma of a value chain of this nature is that it is at the end 
of the stick and is as such just a reflection of either the good or bad work done by supporting 
value chains, e.g. main revenue management value chain. This value chain can never 
independently achieve its mandate, as its success relies on what others have contributed. The 
scope of work for this entire value chain is to design and implement a CoJ Customer Interface 
Value Chain solution. ‘The Customer Interface Value Chain’s organisational scope is limited 
to the CoJ entities currently utilising a system called the Pega (An in house system designed 
to be used for customer relations management in the City) or a similar IT system for 
customer/citizen contact processing. Hence, this includes Joburg Connect (The CoJ call 
centre), People Centres, Revenue, and the UACs, namely Johannesburg Water, City Power, 
Pikitup, Johannesburg Roads Agency, City Parks and MetroBus. Within this scope, it is 
important to note that this Blueprint Report does not include Emergency Management 
Services (EMS). This is primarily driven by the need to manage risks better, thus ensuring the 
programme gets things right with limited services (medium risk) and organisational scope 
and then replicates excellence to include all other services (high risk). With regard to the 
Customer Interface, Programme Phakama is focused on the following,  
"That a Customer Interface Management Value Chain be implemented consistently across all 
City services providing one-stop citizen access.  This will be achieved by implementing a 
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single and common customer database and customer interface IT system throughout the City 
services, along with common customer service practices".58 
It is not part of the scope of Programme Phakama: for CIVC to deliver a CRM strategy 
document for the City, rather to design and implement the functional capability thereof.’  
3.3.2.1 Customer Interface Value Chain Deliverables 
The deliverables of the Customer Interface Value Chain embraces residents, customer's rights 
to be served and the accessibility to its premises.  ‘Customer satisfaction is dependent on the 
successful interaction with the local government institution. Good local governance is 
dependent on strong regional governance and civil society institutions. For example, to 
ensure customer satisfaction, issues of water cannot be dealt with in isolation from issues of 
electricity. Successful service delivery cannot occur by focusing on one element of the value 
chain solely, the entire chain that relates to customer interaction needs to be addressed. The 
challenge in meeting the service needs is really one of building good customer service – 
integrating the different elements of the value chain into a mutually supportive whole. 
Focusing on implementing a Customer Interface value chain needs to be understood in the 
context of the City’s principle of ‘One City, One Vision and One Strategy’.59 This will be 
achieved through centralisation of a single and common customer database, customer 
interface IT system and common customer service practices. JoServe will be a service utility 
that will be established as a core function of the City to optimally deliver customer services in 
collaboration with the UACs and other CoJ departments. The goal is to consistently ensure 
high value experiences across the customer continuum.  These dependencies and service 
arrangements between different service centres of the CoJ are depicted in a Conceptual 
Model, at a competency/component level across the relevant organisational structures, 
depicted by performance measures.   
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3.3.3 Data Management 
One of the critical areas in the rollout and implementation of the SAP solution as part of the 
Programme Phakama was data purification from the legacy systems to make it SAP 
compatible and also resolve any existing data quality issues that will compromise the billing 
on the new system.  Without the data being “cleaned” adequately it will not be possible to 
load the data on SAP and hence enable the newly designed and implemented business 
processes – more important is the ability to generate a correct bill. The main objective of 
Data Management is to purify and create a meta-data for the two value chains in the City.  
3.3.3.1 Data Purification and Management Deliverables 
The core deliverable for this stream is to cleanse data from the various legacy systems that 
exist throughout the City. The legacy systems that were used by the MOEs that are covered 
by the project and the billing system used by the City at that time all had varying information 
about one customer. This problem had to be rectified before the new system could be utilised. 
The final outcome was clean, quality and reliable data of the City’s customers that will allow 
a single view of the customer that will be migrated into the new SAP application. The 
planning and the high level of details are undoubtedly of world class quality. With such 
thorough foundation work, many projects should succeed. The next chapter will detail the 
achievements of the project against the blueprint. Planning is only one element of 
management and it requires other management functions to achieve success.  
3.3.4 The New Service Organisation Business Model 
The Revenue Management and Customer Interface sections of the Blueprint report 
decompose the value chains into competencies and business components, which form the 
building blocks for the proposed service utility (currently referred to as “JoServe”). JoServe 
should be established and running by the end of the Project.  
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3.3.4.1 New Service Organisation – JoServe Deliverables 
The CoJ has in terms of its iGoli 2002 institutional framework adopted a service utility 
business model in which the UACs (Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised Entities) were 
established to manage service delivery on behalf of the CoJ. The iGoli 2002 institutional 
framework was based on the need to resolve a financial crisis in the City, consolidate a 
fragmented organization and to fundamentally improve service delivery to the citizens of the 
City.  This was achieved through the establishment of service utilities to focus on improved 
management of service delivery. However, the establishment of the UACs has resulted in the 
fragmentation and loss of single point accountability for revenue management and customer 
interface services across the CoJ and the UACs. The CoJ identified a need to consolidate its 
fragmented revenue management and customer interface value chains into a single 
accountable customer facing organization. The establishment of a service utility is consistent 
with and complementary to the current working CoJ institutional framework and represents a 
reinforcement of that framework. Furthermore, the creation of a service utility outside of the 
CoJ core administration will allow management the opportunity to focus exclusively on 
improving the core revenue management and customer interface function of the service utility 
which will in turn directly benefit the citizens of the City.60 
3.4 Management Style of Phakama 
3.4.1 Governance of the Programme 
3.4.1.1 Governance Structure 
Similar to other CoJ departments there are two levels of management on the governance 
structure for Programme Phakama, the political / strategic level and the administrative level.  
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Political / strategic structure61 below illustrates a balanced approach to governance for the 
project.  
 
   Figure 2: Programme Phakama Governance Structure 
3.4.1.1.1 The	Mayoral	Sub‐committee 
The role of the Mayoral Sub-committee which is operating at the strategic level is to: 
 Inform Mayoral Committee of progress against strategy 
 Oversee and direct implementation of Programme Phakama strategy 
 Advise Mayoral Committee on strategic risks, issues and needs 
 Monitor alignment of Programme Phakama with CoJ strategy  
The oversight committee consists of members of the mayoral committee, the Chairpersons of 
the boards of the UACs and the City Manager.  
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3.4.1.1.2 Programme	Phakama	Management	Committee 
The role of the Programme Phakama Management Committee that operates at the decision 
making level is to: 
 Ensure Programme is completed on time and within the budget 
 Ensure strategies are aligned with CoJ strategic destination 
 Monitor the execution of all projects under Programme Phakama 
 Approve policies in relation to Programme Phakama interventions  
 Approve the blueprint designs for all projects under Programme Phakama  
 
This committee consists of the City Manager, Executive director of Finance and Economic 
Development, Chief Information officer, Chief Operations Officer, UACs Managing 
Directors and Revenue Management Chief Executive officer. It should be noted that this 
layer of the governance structure changed after the restructuring process in the City that took 
place later in 2006. As a result some of the designations no longer exist in the new structure 
which includes; ‘JoServe was replaced by the Revenue and Customer Relations Department 
(R&CRM), the Chief Operating Officer designation was discontinued and the departments of 
finance and economic development were split.  
3.4.1.1.3 The	Value‐Chain	Steering	Committee	
The Value Chains Steering Committee focus on the operations of the value chains. Its role is 
to: 
 Recommend policies to Programme Management Committee regarding the Value 
Chains management 
 Ensure optimal utilisation of resources allocated to the Value Chains 
 Recommend any major changes in relation to the scope of the project   
 Assist with timely resolution of key decisions 
 Arbitrate differences between UACs & Programme Phakama 
The Committee consists of Programme Managers (from the Project), Executive directors of 
affected departments in the City, The UACs Managers and the Chief Operations Officer.   
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3.4.2 The Administrative level 
Programme Phakama management structure consist of five streams, each with sub-streams. 
Each of the streams has a Stream Manager that reports to the Programme Manager who in 
turn reports to the Programme Director. The Programme Director is the link between 
operations, decision making and the strategic levels. The streams are: CIVC, RMVC, 
Organisational Transformation (OT), Data Management and Information Technology stream.  
3.4.3 Resource Allocation 
To ensure that the project delivers solutions of high quality that responds adequately to the 
identified business challenges, a decision has been made that Programme Phakama acquires 
the services of consultants who will work closely with identified Subject Matter Experts 
(SME) from the City in designing solutions. In total the project consists of 280 CoJ resources 
and 163 consultants supplied by the service provider.   
3.4.4 Programme timelines and delivery approach 
The initial proposed timeline were based on the Deployment Strategy to be a Pilot followed 
by three separate releases based on the constraints of converting customer data and managing 
the risks of impacting customers and the overall effectiveness of the City.62 Figure 3 below 
illuminates the high level delivery plan and time lines of the project. In order to minimise the 
risk to the CoJ customers and the City yet maximise the speed at which the City’s burning 
issues will be addressed, the team recommended that the Phased approach be adopted, 
resulting in the overall timeline illustrated below: 
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Figure 3: Overall Programme Phakama Master Plan 
The approved plan and major stages of work are described in more detail below: 
1. The Design stage during which the team (Consultants and CoJ SMEs) had to work 
towards designing the new solution, establish the tools, plans and templates to be used for 
the duration of the programme and confirm the effort estimates.  The design of the new 
solution incorporate the following: 
a. business processes and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs),  
b. user roles,  
c. basic configuration and prototyped scenarios,  
d. functional designs of all custom components and data conversion programs, 
e. a transfer policy for transferring staff to JoServe,  
f. ring-fenced employees that will be affected, and 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 52 
 
g. human performance capabilities. 
All the solution’s components needed to be accepted and signed off by the business.   
2. The Build and Test stage should result in a fully tested and quality assured solution that 
will be used for Pilot Dress Rehearsal.  During the first two months of this stage, a 
software factory will be established and work will commence with the coding of 
interfaces, data conversion programs, enhancements and reports.  A new organisation 
structure, job descriptions and a performance management framework will be developed 
for JoServe.  Staff will be matched to jobs/positions.  The human performance support 
components will be developed, integrated testing of all system components will be 
performed, data purification and conversion procedures will be developed and tested, and 
implementation preparation will take place.  JoServe will be established as a legal entity.  
The establishment of the JoServe site and facilities will be completed and the required 
corporate support services will be put in place.  This stage will include several iterations 
of integration testing, and user acceptance testing to approve the system, process and 
human performance solutions for all of CoJ’s customer segments.  Once the Pilot Dress 
Rehearsal commences, a subset of the integration testing team will remain to continue 
testing the solution with the subsets of customer that are due to be converted in the later 
releases.   
3. A Pilot implementation stage during which the approved solution had to be deployed for 
an agreed upon representative subset of users and customers of the City.  The overriding 
objective of the pilot is to minimise the risk, uncertainty and pain to the City and the 
customers while verifying the entire solution in live mode (real-time).  This will gain the 
confidence and trust of the City and its customers in the new solution.  The pilot will 
identify the unforeseen key CoJ-specific challenges for the rollout processes in order to 
minimise the risk to further rollouts.  The Pilot subset should be chosen to enable the 
highest number of business scenarios to be verifiable.  To further minimise the risk to the 
City, no Platinum customers will be included in the pilot.  A core group of JoServe 
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employees will be appointed, receive induction and professional skills training and will 
be transferred to the JoServe site.   
4. A Deployment stage for the users and customers of all remaining CoJ Venus and Pega 
databases and PIKITUP. This stage only commenced after the Pilot was declared 
successful and stable.  During the first two months, users were trained, technology 
components installed (i.e. user workstations), a Dress Rehearsal of the deployment 
conducted and Go-Live data converted.  No Platinum customers were converted during 
this stage according to the plan.  Additional trained staff was transferred to JoServe.  User 
support members were deployed on site to verify site readiness and assisted the users with 
pre-conversion activities. This was to be provided by Programme Phakama team 
members for three months after Go-live to enable the City to have a smooth transition 
from the old system to the new one. 
5. A final Deployment stage, during which the solution had to be rolled out to Joburg Water 
and City Power was planned to take place one month apart.  This stage was planned to 
overlap with the previous deployment stage stabilisation activities by three months.  
During the first two months, remaining technology infrastructure had to be implemented, 
users trained, dress rehearsals conducted and data converted.  User support was planned 
to be provided for three months after Go-live for Joburg Water and two months after Go-
Live for City Power.  City Power should require less support due to all their users already 
being familiar with SAP functionality. 
6. The pilot release’s main purpose was to minimise uncertainty and unforeseen business 
issues on a large scale by proving that the solution conforms to business requirements in 
operation for a small subset of customers before general release to the business.  This is 
based on a proven and prudent release strategy that was adopted in numerous previous 
Revenue Management and Customer Interface Value Chain and supporting systems 
implementations.  Platinum customers were excluded from the first rollouts to minimise 
the financial risk and potential media backlash risk during stabilisation.   
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7. As seen on similar large programmes, the importance of the user community to gain 
confidence in the new business solution by witnessing the successful delivery of the first 
rollout regardless of the size was greatly acknowledged.  Past performance, audit reviews 
and representation were used to select the most appropriate legacy database for the pilot 
rollout.  The data for the pilot was prepared so that it can be purified in time.  It was, 
however, imperative to ensure that the customer base and transaction types were a 
representative sample to ensure that as many as possible scenarios are covered during the 
pilot to identify as many challenges as possible.   
8. Participation and communication was planned in the delivery stages to assist in ensuring 
that all affected staff understand the JoServe structure, the future operating model 
between CoJ, JoServe , the UACs and the Staff Transfer Policy and all other relevant 
information that could potentially hinder successful implementation of the project.  This 
would later undoubtedly and greatly assist in minimising fears and in promoting 
acceptance of the change. 
9. Only one customer database was to be used for the pilot rollout, to ensure more attention 
is focused on knowledge transfer, training and support of the associated users. It was also 
proposed that as many users as possible from the remaining databases participate during 
the pilot in order to gain experience and exposure in preparation for the deployment of the 
solution to their respective areas. 
10. The data in the legacy system/was mostly stored logically per region, which facilitated the 
conversion of data by region and consequently would affect a defined subset of users.  By 
converting all Customer data per database concurrently, the affected users would only be 
required to work off the new system for customer processing which would assist in 
avoiding unnecessary impact to the users. 
11. The UAC customers are maintained in separate databases which are different from the 
CoJ customer database.  For this reason, converting one of the UACs will not constitute a 
representative basis for a pilot.  The UAC customer base also includes Platinum 
customers which will increase the financial risk should they be included in a pilot.  
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3.2.1 Detailed Approach 
   
Figure 4: High-Level Programme Critical Path Timeline 
The above figure provides a conceptual view of the overall timelines and critical path 
dependencies of Programme Phakama63.  The major timeline dependencies agreed with major 
external systems i.e. Finance and HR, are also depicted. The evaluation of this project will be 
based on this originally approved timelines.  
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3.5 The Evolvement of ERP Adoption in Programme Phakama 
This section focuses on the progress and the shape the project took during implementation. It 
comprehensively details how the plans turned out, what changes were made to the plan, 
approach, scope and costs and the reasons. According to the original plan in the Programme 
Phakama Blueprint, the project was to be delivered in a period of 30 months. (July 2005 – 
Dec 2007), with the main approach concurrent as phased approach go-live to minimise and 
manage the risk. The above, considering the entire original scope of the project was estimated 
to cost the CoJ a total of R279 000 000.00 (Two hundred and seventy nine million Rands). 
According to the Phakama Master Plan, figure 3 (Page 50), the planning phase that also 
included the mobilisation of human resources was to take place between July and December 
2005. The design phase of the project was to begin in October 2005 according to the plan. It 
is worth mentioning that the period July 2005 – Jan 2006 was utilised for preparatory / 
planning work that included but was not limited to development and approval of the 
Blueprint, approval of the budget and securing of the required resources (human, project 
office space, etc.) as opposed to the plan.  The actual work on the project began four months 
later, in February 2006. This study focuses on that period onwards. The focal point is analysis 
of project progress and changes in the following four main areas of the original plan to 
understand the cause of the changes, increases and delays:  
 Scope 
 System implementation approach,  
 Project timelines 
 Project costs.  
3.5.1 Management of Change 
The overall conceptualisation and planning of the project has been afforded acceptable 
wisdom. The inherent complexity of the project and the proposed technology solutions were 
never undermined. The dynamic nature of the CoJ was also carefully considered. This is 
evident with the controls that have been put in place to ensure that the project is well 
managed. Nonetheless, unforeseen issues were inevitable and continued to disengage the 
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original plan, mainly the scope, approach, costs and original timelines of the project. During 
the project planning, most possible causes of project failure were mitigated, i.e. lack of 
subject matter experts, a clear and detailed statement of works (Contract) with the project’s 
principal contractor, proper leadership, clarity of vision, stakeholder management, etc. The 
project has however proven to be complex even with all the above in place. One of the 
controls adopted was the use of a Change Order Request (COR), to raise and manage any 
change in the project plan and scope. This means change was always anticipated and did not 
come as a surprise, but the actual rate of change was not and perhaps could not be 
anticipated.  Depending on the nature and impact of the change the COR may be approved by 
either the Political Management or the Administrative Management of the Project or CoJ as 
detailed above. For the purpose of this study only approved COR will be reviewed for both 
the in-scoping and approach changes that affected both the timelines and costs, for the 
duration of the project until June 2009. There have been no changes that pertains to de-
scoping of certain deliverables from the project plan, therefore all the changes effected, 
increased both the original costs and amplified the project scope thus resulting in delayed 
delivery timelines for the entire project. A review of the approved CORs presented a picture 
as detailed below. It points out that the rate of change for a project as complex as this one to 
be quite high. The first approved COR was raised just six months into the project – 4th July 
2006 
3.5.1.1 Scope Creep 
The scope creep is viewed by the author as common in many projects and it is also generally 
accelerated by the Knowledge Economy. Generally in all projects, the intent is to evade scope 
creep, since it has an immediate negative impact on a project with regards to time, effort, 
resources and budget. However, at most times scope creep eventually brings long term 
benefit with regards to the overall project and the organisation itself. This project also 
experienced those unavoidable project scope changes. Usually, not all activities run as 
smooth as planned without any creeping weave that changes the original plan and at times the 
overall objectives. Adapting and adjusting as the project progresses is common, important 
and a manageable exercise. It is the magnitude of this change in many projects that 
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distinguishes such projects and makes it necessary to understand the high level of variance 
when plans and budgets are prepared so they can be adhered to. Following that, evaluation of 
projects mainly relies on the original plan and budget and this further creates the discord. The 
question is, is it still necessary to plan for projects that are complex even when it is expected 
that the variance between the plan and the deliverable will be higher? Certainly, most agree 
that a plan is necessary as it provides a road map of what needs to be done and how, most 
importantly, it provides a starting point. It generally never happens that with any huge plan, 
things always goes according to the plan, but a plan is nonetheless required to give shape and 
a complete picture to what needs to be achieved. Project planning is vital for many reasons. 
Even though change is probable in any project, a plan provides a structure of what needs to 
be achieved by when, detailing the costs associated with that. A project plan will clarify the 
approach to be taken, the scope, the duration of the project, deliverables of the project and 
resources required. Without the above it is not possible to make a business case for the 
project to be awarded, as a result planning is important. Little or no changes at all with 
regards to any project scope, is always better and makes the overall management of the 
project relatively easy. During the period under study (Feb 2006 to June 2009) the 
Programme Phakama approved a total of 45 changes that pertains to the scope of the project. 
The changes varied in nature from those with small impact, others with medium and to those 
with high or critical impact. This categorisation of the change was very important for 
decision making as well, since it makes it apparent what kind of impact the change has on the 
project and CoJ business at large and the potential of each to derail the project. Each COR 
was thoroughly investigated to also include the cost each will carry. Of the 45 CORs, 35 were 
of small impact and most with no cost attached to them; seven of the CORs were of medium 
impact to the progress of the project and on COJ business at large with varying costs.  
The remaining three were changes of critical or high impact in nature which largely cost huge 
amounts of money. In total these 45 Programme Phakama scope related CORs added an 
overall sum of R18 585 448, 72 to the original project budget. This amounts to a 7% increase 
to the originally estimated project costs. It is clear that in the beginning the changes were 
frequent and dropped in numbers as the project gained momentum and shape. The changes as 
indicated above required an additional 1 936 (one thousand, nine hundred and thirty six) 
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manpower hours of full time employees (FTE) for the project, which resulted in 242 days in 
total that could possibly be shared by more than one resource (FTE) in accordance with the 
expertise required for each COR. It cannot be denied that an increase in scope 45 times is too 
high. The nature of the problem, the location of the problem, the nature of the solution to the 
problem and the current local and global environment all contributed to the changes which if 
ignored could have led to the failure of the project. Even though the blueprint was as detailed 
as any project plan could be in relation to all aspects of the project, i.e. scope, approach, 
budget, etc. change was inevitable.  
3.5.1.2 Implementation Approach 
It cannot be over emphasised how important it is in any mission to have a clearly defined 
approach. The project under study was also afforded that. However in the period between 
February 2006 to June 2009 a total of 21 (Twenty one) COR relating to project approach 
were approved. Of the twenty one only one was of critical or high impact to the project and 
CoJ business, whilst two were of medium impact and 18 were of small impact. Immediately 
it is noticeable that the changes in relation to approach were not as many compared to the 
scope creep. This can be attributed to good planning. A high number of changes here would 
have resulted in the project taking a completely different picture to what it was originally 
planned to be. The other noticeable factor here is that most of the changes made were not 
critical in nature indicating that the situation was reasonable manageable. Only one COR was 
almost obligatory to endorse to make the project a success and beneficial to the City. Even 
though the changes were not many they however had cost implications in both time and 
monetary value. Approach related changes are difficult to manage, unlike scope creep where 
more work is simply added, approach changes affect the technique or the strategy of how to 
achieve the results. Approach changes usually have a more rippling effect than scope 
changes. The 21 project approach changes resulted in an additional cost of R134 614 650, 60 
to the original budget. This is about 50% more than the original estimated cost / budget for 
the project.  The changes experienced included matters such as: 
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 Changes in go-live approach from phased approach to full bang64 
 Using external (Step in) resources and not CoJ resources due to lack of required 
expertise 
 Investigation and decision around the use of win client or web client version of the 
solution which turned out to be different from the original plan  
3.5.1.3 Scheduling  
With a project as huge as Programme Phakama and a solution as complex as SAP it is almost 
inevitable not to have delays in the project. Added to this, the economic downturn 
experienced by the global world, and not only South Africa, undoubtedly had its impact. 
During the period of economic meltdown, even municipalities felt the brunt. Most of them 
had difficulty with revenue collection, which is the main source of revenue for local 
government. . Despite its pre-eminence among cities country-wide, the City of Johannesburg 
did not escape and also felt the impact of loss of earnings. The intrinsic complex nature of 
this project and the external environment played a major role in causing time delays to this 
project. Looking at the number of change order requests for scope and approach, time delays 
were unavoidable to ensure that the project achieved its objectives successfully. Project 
timeline issues were raised very early in the project. The first happened just four months into 
the project in July 2006 with an overall project time line extension of 3 months, resulting in 
an overall time line variance of 7% only. The time line as per the original plain in the 
blueprint was that the project will be fully delivered by December 2007. Re-planning 
exercises dominated most parts of the project. Each approved change order request that had a 
high impact was generally followed by a re-planning exercise to adjust where necessary. This 
was a management mechanism to address project alignment issues brought about by the 
changes. Dependencies also played a significant role on time delays as there were various 
deliverables that were entirely dependent on completion of others or at other times, on the 
decision making process. The project progress report of June 2009 indicates that the project 
                                                 
64 This may have changed back to the original phased approach implementation late in 2009 of which the period 
is not covered by this research 
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had only achieved 50% of the scope including the new changes in comparison to the original 
plan.  By June 2009 the project timelines were extended to June 2010. This already is an 
increase of 120% from the original project time line of December 2007 for project go-live. 
Overall the project timelines were increased by two and a half years from December 2007 to 
June 2010. 
3.5.1.4 Costs 
Wherever there is change in plan, scope and approach, it is inevitable that there will be a 
financial impact. Programme Phakama also experienced cost variations. The cost variations 
were not only incremental, there were also various instances where there were savings due to 
change of approach. The original estimated cost of the project (Two hundred and seventy 
nine million Rands) inevitably never remained static. With every change of scope, approach, 
re-planning and time delays the project costs were mainly increased with few instances where 
change meant savings. With a project of this magnitude this was bound to happen. The 
project ensured that change was properly managed to maintain harmonisation throughout the 
project deliverables, time, resources and plan. Using the data / information available, it can be 
approximated that the original costs had increased by an estimated 54 % by June 2009.  
3.5.2 Challenges 
To further demonstrate the complexity of the project and the huge management demand to 
realise its objectives, it is worth mentioning other changes that were significant and had 
imperative impact on the overall project, and mainly the approach. Most of these changes 
emanated from the external environment of the project and mainly CoJ internal environment. 
Their impact cannot be ignored.  
3.5.2.1 Leadership Changes 
South Africa went through local government elections in April 2007. This always brings 
about change in any local government. Political leadership of the City also changed and this 
resulted in internal restructuring post the elections. With the change in political leadership 
came the new Administrative head (City Manager) for the Municipality. The internal 
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restructuring resulted in new political portfolios and departments, merging and splitting of 
some portfolios and departments and also new zoning of the City’s regions. The Project 
Management Directorate of the City was established to manage all projects that cut across the 
City. This meant that the Project now had a project executive who is not part of the functional 
project team. Amidst these changes the City afforded the project a priority status and offered 
its support to ensure its success and completion. The creation of a project management role 
within the office of the Municipal Manager gave the project a boost and a platform at the 
highest administrative management level of the City.  
3.5.2.2 Organisational Changes  
According to the Blueprint of Programme Phakama, the realisation of the project includes the 
establishment of a MOE, provisionally named Joserve. The entity shall be responsible for the 
centralised revenue management and customer relation function in the City. As the project 
progressed, it was realised that the challenges around the establishment of an entity from a 
legal perspective were not in the best interest of the City. As a result a new home for the 
project deliverables had to be found. The restructuring that took place after the election gave 
the City an opportunity to do that. A new department called Revenue and Customer Relations 
Management (R&CRM) was established that became the business owner of the project 
deliverables. The billing department was done away with, resulting with the immediate 
establishment of the R&CRM department. All staff from the Billing department were 
migrated to the new department. The Organisational Transformation Value Chain of the 
project faced an increased work load to ensure that all relevant and identified staff were 
moved from the MOEs to the department and that they were adequately and fairly placed in 
their new positions through a job matching exercise.  
3.5.2.3 Merging of Value Chains 
The establishment of the R&CRM department in 2007, its inherent relationship to the project 
deliverables and the advanced progress status of the project determined a need to merge the 
project’s value chains, since they encouraged silos which at this stage of the project was 
detrimental to project alignment and stakeholder management. It was becoming increasingly 
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difficult for the project to engage with one voice with the R&CRM department. What each 
value chain was doing needed to be communicated amongst the value chains and business. 
The earlier than planned establishment of this department was beneficial to the project and to 
the City because business had a voice and their needs and requirements could be identified 
and addressed during the project sooner rather than later. The Customer Relation 
Management Value Chain and the Revenue Management Value Chain merged and were 
called Solution Stream Value Chain. This was done to harmonise and synchronise all the 
deliverables whilst the project was at the system testing phase. Deliverables such as user 
acceptance testing produces better results when the approach covers the end to end processes. 
The quality of data also influences the success or failure of the revenue function / billing and 
equally so the quality work done by revenue function has a direct impact on the quality of 
customer relation function. The merging of the two value chains afforded synchronisation of 
cause and effect.  
3.5.2.4 Contract Management 
By the end of 2008 the City ended the contract with the original service provider / contractor 
due to non-delivery. Various reasons internally and externally were presented as causes to 
this unforeseen change. It became inevitable to find a new service provider on board which 
further increased the delay in the project progress. The handover process was not an easy 
exercise due to the complex nature of the project and the related planning and administrative 
process that went with it. In any project a change of service provider never presents 
immediate benefits. It was a difficult time for the City. This kind of change brings with it new 
costs that further increases the already stretched budget.  
3.5.3 Overall Project Progress 
It was originally planned to complete the project within two and a half years. The evidence 
has indicated that the project plan was in the end extended by a further two and a half years. 
The completion date of the project was extended from end 2007 to June 2010. In total it took 
five years to complete a project originally planned for half the time with double the costs, 
effort and scope. The envisaged dependencies and approach were severely affected  and 
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increased in volume by the unforeseen dependencies, new legislation, hidden costs, 
unforeseen circumstances, politically related changes, external environment, miscalculations 
of efforts and the economic crisis. These included but were not limited to the new Municipal 
Property Rates Act, system integration dependencies and concerns raised regarding the 
legacy systems and interfaces to third party systems. All these put together resulted in the 
scope and approach of the project changing many times to ensure that the required results 
were met ultimately. It became apparent that the project management team had to adapt and 
adjust or risk dismal failure of the project. It was also apparent that adopting a different plan 
is not always a matter of choice with projects such as these but often a matter of accepting 
unforeseen circumstances in an effort to achieve the desired goal. Evidence also shows that 
the risks and dependencies to the project did not necessarily decrease as the project 
progressed 
The risks and issues consistently stayed at levels of above 70% and the seriousness of the risk 
increased instead, i.e. migration of staff in relation to labour issues and legislation from the 
MOEs to the R&CRM department, the technology risk posed by the Unified Customer 
Contact Centre (UCCC) not ready for integration testing, the new Municipal Property Rates 
Act (MPRA) and testing of the Land Information System (LIS). Project timelines had to be 
moved three times. Figure 5and 6 below indicates the project progress status by March 2009 
and the project timelines by June 2009 which were not changed until the completion of the 
project. It is clear from the two illustrations below that even though the project has 
progressed satisfactorily considering the slippages, scope creep, financial strain and changed 
timelines, however there are still areas that posed considerable risks to the overall progress 
and threaten the successful completion of the project.   
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Figure 5: Overall Project Progress Summary 
Figure 5 above is an analysis of the project status at the time the new service provider took 
over. A closer look at it reveals that the project is highly threatened from a risk perspective. 
The figure provides a holistic view of the project progress in relation to organisational aspects 
and identified dependencies. The aspects that pose immediate risk and need urgent attention 
constitute 21.5%, whilst potential risks that need constant monitoring amount to 75% and 
only 3.5% aspects of the project that has no risk. Figure 6 below is a clip of the new and final 
timelines of the project, confirming the envisaged completion date of June 2010. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 An analysis of the project reveals an overwhelming change brought about mainly by the 
environment and interaction between various parts of the project and organisation. Almost all 
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aspects of this project experienced some form of change. The project scope changed 45 times 
resulting in 7% overall budget increase. The project approach changed 21 times causing the 
budget to increase by 50%. The project timeline increased by 120% which was inevitable 
because of the scope and approach changes. The overall budget of the project increased by 
54% from R279 000 000 to R432 199 999.32. In a positive light the organisation identified 
and acknowledged that the changes needed to be addressed. Another issue noticeable in the 
analysis is the fact that a change in one part of the project or organisation called for a 
response in most if not all other parts of the project, i.e. a change in leadership leads to a 
change in strategy, a change in strategy leads to a change in project scope and approach 
which required the entire project to be reviewed in terms of timelines, costs and efforts.  
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Figure 6: Final Project Delivery Timelines 
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Chapter 4 
What happened in the 
Public Sector elsewhere in 
the World? 
Now that the project of the CoJ has been presented, it is fitting that in this chapter the focus 
shifts to how projects similar to Programme Phakama have performed. The aim in this 
chapter is to establish whether what happened in Programme Phakama is an isolated pattern 
of events or if similar trends are common in other local and international projects. Projects 
reviewed in this chapter are limited to those implementing ERP systems in the public sector. 
4.1 Global ERP Adoption 
Making a decision on how and when to implement an ERP is a challenge that does not have a 
wrong or right answer but constitutes a good or bad choice. Organisations mainly implement 
ERP systems first and it only becomes clearer after or during implementation if the choices 
made were indeed good or bad. At this point there are only two things that can be done when 
implementation does not go as planned, amend the plan and continue or disband the project.  
The CoJ is not the only organisation to have implemented an ERP solution of this nature, 
which is naturally a complex system. The magnitude of Programme Phakama is however 
wider than usual. An assessment of what happened in other organisations and/or countries 
that implemented an ERP, to determine elements of similarity, differences and the influence 
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by and on knowledge management is important. Organisational knowledge and knowledge on 
ERP system greatly influences the outcome of ERP implementation, in many situations this 
knowledge is possessed by two different entities and usually fails to fuse together for better 
results. Similarly knowledge embedded in ERP greatly influences the success and focus of 
Knowledge Management in an organisation. Many organisations all over the world have in 
the recent years jumped on the band wagon to improve their processes through the use of 
technology solutions for various reasons such as, agility, reliable data, standardization of 
processes, competitiveness, information as an asset, etc.  According to recent studies 
conducted, there is still a high rate of Information Technology projects that are not 
succeeding and that are challenged65. A study in 2006 by the Standish group illustrates that 
50% of projects done by governments failed or were abandoned whereas 52% were above 
budget and behind schedule. The study found an average cost overrun of 45%, time overrun 
of 63% and functionality delivered at an average of 67%.  The diagram below demonstrates 
the success and failure rate of Information Technology projects from the Standish Group 
2009 study.  
                                                 
65 Wan K S C, Ma L C K, Banejee P. 2009. The Importance of Manager’s soft competence on IT project 
success:  
    An exploratory study in the banking context. Association of Information Systems.117. A study was conducted 
by  
    the Standish Group (2009) which shows that around one third of the IT projects were classified as successful 
in its  
    studies in 2004, 2006 and 2009 and that IT project failure rate has since increased from 2004.. IT Project 
Success  
    Rate (Standish Group, www. Standishgroup.com/press/article) 
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Figure 7: IT Project Success Rate By The Standish Group 2009 
According to the Standish Group, Gartner conducted a study in 2007 on IT spending as a 
percentage of revenue by industry66. The Government sector is the third largest spender 
preceded by the banking and financial sector and the media industry sector. If 50% of the IT 
projects by government fail or are abandoned, considering that the government is the third 
largest spender on IT, it means about 50% of the money spent on IT in the government sector 
is futile. Figure 7 above indicate that the situation around successful implementation of IT 
projects is not getting better. Instead there is a noticeable lack of improvement with the 2009 
statistics confirming an increase in failed projects and a decrease in successful projects. This 
is a picture that is not impressive compared to the spending and the development trends in the 
IT sphere. Does it mean that the world lacks required knowledge to implement successful 
projects of this nature?  Let us review what really happened on some IT ERP projects in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa.  
                                                 
66 Wan K S C, Ma L C K, Banejee P. 2009. The Importance of Manager’s soft competence on IT project 
success:  
    An exploratory study in the banking context. Association of Information Systems. 118 
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4.2 South Africa 
South Africa is one of the countries that have in the past decades increasingly used and 
implemented technology solutions to improve efficiency in organisations. Such organisations 
have benefited in terms of preparing themselves for implementation of Knowledge 
Management. Various public sector institutions have to date implemented huge and complex 
ERP solutions. These institutions include City of Cape Town Municipality, City of Tshwane 
Municipality, Eskom, Regional Electricity Distributor and City Power amongst others. South 
Africa, in both public and private sectors, has acknowledged the benefits of KM and has put 
tremendous efforts in improving its understanding of Knowledge Management and 
implemented technologies such as ERPs to create an opportune environment for its 
implementation and success.  
4.2.1 Cape Town Municipality 
The City of Cape Town, one of the largest municipalities in South Africa, launched Project 
Ukuntinga in 2001 to implement a SAP ERP solution that integrates the billing systems of its 
seven constituent councils. The City is home to 75% of the population of the Western Cape 
Province. Ukuntinga is an isiXhosa word meaning ‘to soar and rise above’. The project is 
regarded as the second largest SAP project in the country67. One of the unique requirements 
South Africa has on awarding tenders regardless of size, complexity and costs is that a 
company must be Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) compliant. The City of Cape Town 
project was awarded to a newly established company regarded as inexperienced at the time, 
Cornerstone, an enterprise solutions integration company.  BEE is defined by the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry as an integrated and coherent socio-economic 
process that directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings 
about significant increases in the number of black people that manage, own and control the 
                                                 
67 SAP South Africa. ERP for the City of Cape Town: SAP modernization for the benefit of the citizens.  
    Available: http://www.sap.com/southafrica/about/company/ps/press/1.epx.  
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country’s economy as well as significant decreases in income inequalities68. This is a good 
tool to address the historic inequalities. The main problem that has the potential to derail the 
good intent of the BEE laws is the fact that BEE has not been given a time limit. The intent to 
bring balance can eventually result with the same inequalities, but with different population 
groups.  
4.2.1.1 Scope  
 In 2000 seven previously autonomous municipalities in greater Cape Town were merged into 
a single metropolitan unicity called the City of Cape Town. One of its main objectives at the 
time was to integrate and streamline the delivery of equitable city services and reduce costs. 
The scope of Project Ukuntinga extended across all City departments, which began with the 
modelling of the business processes for the chosen SAP solution to ensure integration across 
various processes and departments69. The scope also included the integration of the City’s 
billing systems so as to improve the revenue collection of the City.   
4.2.1.2 Timelines 
The project was launched in the second semester of 2001 when the modelling of the 
processes began. In December 2002 the 1st release of the SAP R/3 was achieved. This saw the 
pilot for the 2nd release in March 2003. In June 2003 the Rates and Billing solution was 
implemented and the final deployment of the 2nd release was realised in September 200370. 
Even though data on the original (planned) timelines could not be accessed, the actual 
delivery dates are impressive. The City of Cape Town implemented this project in a period of 
just about three years.  
                                                 
68 South Africa. Department of Trade and Industry. 2004. South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A strategy 
of the BBBEE, 12.  
69 Other project experience. Available: 
http://www.hetuconsulting.com/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40:eoh-hetu-staff-
other-project-experience&catid=36:our-experience&Itemid=21 
70 City of Cape Town Systems Implementation. Available: 
www.accenture.com/accenture/registration/PtintThis.aspx?GUID=(FE11E9F1-8.  
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4.2.1.3 Costs 
Project Ukuntinga has cost the City of Cape Town a total of R355 million in the three years. 
The total project cost was fully recovered in the 2009 financial year due to financial value 
add the system has brought. 71 
4.2.1.4 Benefits and Identified Challenges 
Project Ukuntinga has been hailed as one of the first successful ERP implementation projects 
in local government. It has seen the City of Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg 
municipalities following in its footsteps in implementing SAP. Even though the scope differs 
slightly, both the City of Tshwane and Johannesburg used the Cape Town project as a 
benchmark and drew a lot of lessons from it. The project Ukuntinga has seen various benefits 
that includes a centralised IT system which led to the delivery of standardised services, 
citizen focused government with 24/7 access, streamlined revenue collection, improved 
employee productivity, duplication minimised and reduced operating costs72. More than 300 
processes were modelled and implemented whilst more than 113 legacy systems and 70 
interfaces were replaced 
4.2.2 Department of Home Affairs 
The South African National Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is facing two major IT 
projects that are bungled due to various reasons, the Who Am I Online (WAIO) and the 
Smart Card ID (Identity Document) projects. The tender for the WAIO was awarded to a big 
player in the ICT industry in South Africa, Gijima Ast, at a cost of R4 billion. WAIO is an 
integrated IT system intended to enable the DHA to process transactions for issuing identity 
documents, birth, death and marriage certificates, passports, visa permits, section 22 asylum 
permits, refugee identity documents, citizenship certificates and permanent and temporary 
residents permits electronically. This system allows transactional processing and 
                                                 
71 Cape Town’s Smart City Strategy in South Africa. 24 – 25. Available: www.idrc.ca/en/ev-115669-201-1-DO 
72 Other project experience. 
Available:http://www.hetuconsulting.com/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40:eoh-
hetu-staff-other-project-experience&catid=36:our-experience&Itemid=21 
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simultaneously supports information about photographs, fingerprints, signatures, voice 
recordings, demographic information and supporting documents73. The system was to link 
with the automated fingerprint identification system. The system was also to be linked with 
those in the Immigration Office, the police, health department and the revenue services. The 
project was supposed to pave a way for the smart chip technology such as electronic 
passports and smart ID cards74.  
The system implementation is a prerequisite for the Smart ID card. The WAIO project was so 
plagued by delays and non-delivery that the DHA cancelled the tender citing non-delivery in 
200875. On the other hand the Smart ID Cards project did not enjoy any success either. The 
Department of Home Affairs introduced the Smart ID Card project which was aimed at 
replacing the current green ID book which is manually produced and posed major challenges 
due to interventions in the processing of applications for IDs. The Cabinet approved the 
Smart ID Card (SIDC) project in July 2001. It was only in March 2005 that the DHA 
received approval by Cabinet to start with the procurement process of the SIDC solution and 
service provider. The DHA communicated to Cabinet that the SIDC pilot project will be 
rolled out in April 2008. The State Information Technology Agency (SITA) was requested to 
assist with the procurement process as it is mandatory to do so for all government 
departments. In the above process the state organs involved were the department, National 
Treasury and SITA, by the end of 2009 the Procurement process was deemed irregular and 
had not progressed as the process was halted.   
4.2.2.1 Scope 
The scopes of both the projects were to integrate business systems and replace all manual 
processes with on-line and real time transactions.  
                                                 
73 Engelbrecht L. 2010. Smart ID cards next year? Or the next? Available:      
    www.deenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7015p2 
74 Gijima AST disputes R4 bn contract cancellation in South Africa. Available: 
    http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-509/money/gijima-ast-disputes/en 
75 Gijima AST disputes R4 bn contract cancellation in South Africa. Available: 
    http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/en/issue-no-509/money/gijima-ast-disputes/en 
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4.2.2.2 Costs and Timelines 
The budget originally requested for the SIDC system was R1.4 billion whereas the WAIO 
costs were originally estimated at R4 billion. Both the projects were intended to be delivered 
in time for the FIFA 2010 world cup and this was not achieved.  
4.2.2.3 Benefits and Identified Challenges  
The two projects were clearly held up by various inefficiencies that led to non-delivery of 
either. There is clear evidence of poor planning and coordination76. This resulted in SITA 
abandoning/halting the SIDC project due to problems with the initial tendering process. The 
fact that it took too long to take decisions and too long for the project to take off resulted in 
the project not materialising at all after it had been  on the radar screens of the DHA and 
involved stakeholders for nearly nine years. The integrity of procurement process is also 
questionable, although there are clear guidelines on processes, procedures and protocols to be 
followed. Does this mean that it takes a decade to plan to fail? The WAIO tender was 
awarded successfully and work resumed, however that did not continue for long before the 
contract was cancelled by the DHA citing non-delivery?  Could BEE have had an influence 
on this?  What led to Gijima’s non-delivery?  Does it mean the South African public sector 
will never realise the real benefits of Knowledge Management and reap the benefit of the 
money spent – on failed projects? It is systems such as these that enable successful 
implementation of Knowledge Management. ERP systems also present a natural platform for 
aggregating knowledge across different parts of an organisation77. Gijima Ast is contesting 
the DHA’s decision and the matter was not finalised by the time of penning this study.  
4.2.3 Centre for Intellectual Property and Registration (CIPRO) 
The South African Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO) is one 
of the latest victims of a failed procurement of ERP system and implementation. CIPRO 
                                                 
76 Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 2010. Briefing by the Department of Home Affairs on their strategic plan 
and budget for 2010/11. Available: www.pmg.org.za/report/20100310-department-home-affairs.  
77 Becerra-Fernandez  I, Gonzalez A, Sabherwal R. 2004. Knowledge Management: Challenges, Solutions and 
Technologies:44. 
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awarded a tender and launched a project to implement a content management system. It is 
common knowledge that a Content Management system is an ERP system that is 
fundamental to the successful implementation of Knowledge Management in any 
organisation. Its successful implementation is the foundation on which Knowledge 
Management is built upon. CIPRO awarded the tender in 2009 to a ‘new kid on the block’ 
Valor IT which was three months prior at the time, to implement a content management 
system and subsequently, the company was paid millions of Rands in advance78.  
4.2.3.1 Scope 
The scope of the project was limited to implementation of a content management solution for 
the entire CIPRO offices, which covers functionalities such as document management, 
records management, workflow, access management, audit trail, etc.  
4.2.3.2 Cost and Timelines  
The tender was awarded for a remarkable sum of R352 million.  R56 million of the total 
amount was paid to the service provider as advance payment before any work could resume.  
4.2.3.3 Benefits and Identified Challenges 
The tender was subsequently cancelled and an investigation launched in to the procurement 
process followed when awarding this tender. As a result no work was performed by the 
service provider amidst receiving an advance payment of R56 million. Could this be BEE 
taken too far? Or just another project that went horribly wrong?  
4.3 United States 
The United States of America (US) did not escape the wrath of IT project failure in its public 
sector. Just like many other countries this happened, happens often and happen because of 
certain reasons that if learned from, recurrence can be averted in future projects. Technology 
                                                 
78 Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 2010. Briefing by the Department of Home Affairs on their strategic plan 
and budget for 2010/11. Available: www.pmg.org.za/report/20100310-department-home-affairs 
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projects have moved beyond evaluation based on, on time and on budget, and should strive to 
strike a win-win situation between the client and the service provider. 
4.3.1 The FBI Virtual Case Files Project 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) kicked off the Virtual Case file project in 2001 
aimed at implementing an automated online mechanism for handling all the typical paper 
based forms in use for routine case reports. The system will allow for sharing and cross 
referencing of virtually all the information gathered daily. Problems became apparent when 
the system was tested. The FBI reported that the system was not operating as required and a 
flood of change requests began. The change requests inadvertently affected the interfaces and 
the alignment thereof. The situation resulted in complexities that could not be, and were not, 
adequately addressed at the time. The system testing also identified that the features that were 
not required were implemented where as those that were required were not implemented 
resulting in 400 system level deficiencies. After four years (in 2005) the system was 
abandoned after $170 million had been spent. 
4.3.1.1 Scope 
The Virtual Case File project was the third and largest part of the FBI project called the 
Trilogy project. The first two parts focused on upgrading of the software and hardware for the 
FBI and that of the FBI’s communication network. The scope of the Virtual Case File project 
was limited to the upgrading of the case management system to allow easier access and 
sharing of case related information throughout the FBI. At the same time the 2001 September 
11 attack on the United States brought even more pressure on the project to deliver faster, the 
scope creep of the three parts projects grew by 80%79. 
                                                 
79 Eggen D, Witte G. 2006. The FBI upgrade that wasn’t: $170 million brought an unusable computer  
    system. Washington Post. Available:http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1364715.html 
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4.3.1.2 Costs and Timelines 
The FBI’s Virtual Case Files project was planned to take three years, but it ended up taking 
four years with requirements still not met.  The project cost overran by 89%.  
4.3.1.3 Benefits and Identified Challenges  
The first two parts of the Trilogy project delivered amidst huge challenges. The Virtual Case 
File was clouded by poor planning and made a number of mistakes/choices, ingredients of a 
failed project that led to the project being eventually abandoned. The following points were 
noted and reported80: 
 A choice to build a new system and not modify commercially existing software.  
 The project was planned to be launched all at once with minimal testing beforehand. 
 Lack of knowledgeable people and expertise internally to develop the kind of 
sophisticated information technology system that it needed. 
 Badly designed business requirements which resulted with an 80% scope creep 
 Unrealistic timelines 
 Poorly managed contract 
4.4 Canada 
Many cities around the world have in recent years implemented ERP solutions to streamline 
their processes. City of Ottawa and City of Winnipeg in Canada implemented a successful 
ERP solution in the early 2000s. Both projects delivered on time and at cost. This proves that 
it is possible to achieve a high success rate on ERP implementations in local government. 
4.4.1 City of Winnipeg ERP 
The City of Winnipeg developed a larger vision of streamlining and integrating more than 
100 of its diverse systems scattered across the City’s various departments with remarkable 
                                                 
80 Eggen G, Witte G. 2006. The FBI upgrade that wasn’t: $170 million brought an unusable computer    
    system. Washington Post. Available: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1364715.html 
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results. The City of Winnipeg used ERP implementation to address the many operational 
inefficiencies brought about by the incompatible and disconnected legacy applications81.   
4.4.1.1 Scope  
A service provider was sourced to assist the City of Winnipeg to implement an ERP solution 
that integrated systems across its 14 departments. The main goal of the project was to 
streamline business processes, improve decision making, reduce costs, improve customer 
service and provide a single and consistent view of data across the organisation. The scope of 
the ERP had two main components, the Human Resources component consisting of four 
modules (payroll, benefits, time and labour) and the Finance component consisting of five 
modules (general ledger, accounts payable, purchasing, project accounts and inventory 
control).  
4.4.1.2 Timelines  
The project was able to implement all financial modules along with the first phase of Human 
Resources components in only 10 months.  
4.4.1.3 Benefits and Identified Challenges  
This project is a typical example of ERP project success in the local government. Successful 
implementation saw the City of Winnipeg positioning itself well for future growth. The new 
system aligned Human Resources, Finance and the IT across all 14 departments, along with 
real time information management and employee self-service.  
4.5 United Kingdom 
As early as 2003 Nick Huber82 raised complexity as one of the factors that increased the 
likelihood of failure or success of IT projects. Even though IT projects have become a 
                                                 
81 City of Winnipeg: Taking the lead. Available:http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CA/ca/services/consulting/ 
    7cfa01f0ed5fb110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm 
82 Huber N. 2003. Hitting targets? The state of UK IT project management.  Computer Weekly; 11/4/2003,  
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common and recurring undertaking in many organisations today, their costs are huge but their 
success is very scarce.  
The UK has reported a failure rate of 7 in every 10 government IT projects83. The UK spends 
about £14 billion per year with only a success rate of 30%. One of these 70% failed projects 
that received enormous criticism in the UK is the National Health Services (NHS) National 
Programme for IT (NPfIT) which terribly overrun deadlines and had hugely inflated costs.  
4.5.1 The NHI’s National Programme for IT 
The National Programme for IT was an initiative of the Department of Health in England in 
2003 to move the NHS towards a single, centrally-maintained electronic records for patients 
and to connect 30 000 general practitioners to 300 hospitals, providing secure and audited 
access to these records. The cost of the programme together with its on-going management 
problems has placed it at the centre of on-going debate. 
4.5.1.1 Scope  
The main objective of NPfIT was to provide better, faster and safer patient care in England. 
The programme was initiated as a ten year programme that was divided into a number of 
deliverables. These include integrated care records service, electronic prescribing, electronic 
appointment booking, medical imaging software, underpinning IT infrastructure, 
performance management of primary care and central email and directory services. The scale 
of the programme was huge and undoubtedly riddled with challenges and complex issues that 
had to  be dealt with.  
                                                                                                                                                        
   22 - 24 
83 Espiner G. 2007. Seven in 10 UK government IT projects fail. ZDnet UK. Available: 
    http://www.zdnetasia.com/seven-in-10-u-k-government-it-projects-fail-62014045.htm. Joe Harley, the CIO of  
    the UK Department of Works and Pensions called for projects to be completed at a lower cost for the tax 
payers.  
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4.5.1.2 Timelines and Costs  
The initial plan of the project was for a period of ten years at a cost of £6.2bn.to cover 
procurement, development and delivery of NPfIT core systems. However actual cost as at 
mid-2010 when the programme was finally scrapped, was reported as £11.4bn of the 
forecasted £12.7bn. At this point many of the deliverables were in place and integrated.84As 
at January 2009 the programme was reported to be four years behind schedule85.  
4.5.1.3 Benefits and Identified Challenges  
The Programme received a lot of criticism in the media and many challenges faced by the 
Programme were identified. These challenges included:  
 Poor relations between the suppliers and clinicians 
 Poor management caused a number of service providers to pull out of the programme 
voluntarily and otherwise, i.e. Accenture, Fujitsu services, etc., resulting in financial 
loss for the remaining service providers. 
 The project cost doubled 
 The programme was scrapped before the 10 year timeline was reached.  
4.6 The Common Factors 
The rapid changes of IT are faster than any huge project can deliver and equally so the nature 
and interconnectedness of problems the IT is meant to address. Challenges are therefore 
inherent which usually lead to delays, change of plan, approach, scope, abandonment of 
projects and inflated costs amongst others. There are similarities in the nature of challenges 
faced by projects all over the world. A closer look at those reviewed in this chapter reveals 
the following: 
                                                 
84 Grant I. 2010. Government scraps £1.7bn NHS National Programme for IT. Available: 
    http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2010/09/09/242670/Government-scraps-16312.7bn-NHS-National 
Programme-for.htm 
85 NHS connecting for health. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NHS_Connecting_for_Health 
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4.6.1 The Delivered Product and Specifications Not the Same 
The system specifications are meant to specify what the system should do. In many IT 
projects if not all, the end product always differs from the specification. There are many 
reasons that can cause that, such as poor crafting of the specifications, lack of understanding 
and knowledge by organisations of what the solution should really do, etc. These are all 
organisational internal matters, although there could also be issues that originate externally 
affecting the organisation,  that may in turn influence the organisation’s positive 
achievements. Therefore, the most striking reason that has not yet been explored could be that 
the rapid change within and outside the organisation  and the changes in the relationship of 
the various ERP modules that occurred from the specification development to the actual 
system implementation, which are usually many, renders the developed specifications faulty. 
The City of Johannesburg’s Programme Phakama had what was believed to be the best 
specifications having used the City’s experts and industry experts to develop them. Needless 
to say, during the period under review the project saw a total of 21 change order requests 
relating to planning and approach being approved and a change in scope done 45 times. The 
rate of change is undeniably high.  The NPfIT in the UK is one of the projects riddled by 
internal and external issues that eventually led to the abandonment of the project after 10 
years of managing the changes with regards to both the needs of the organisation and the IT 
offering at any given time. The original business requirements were changed several times 
over the 10 year period so that they could be relevant to the current needs of the organisation. 
Still, this resulted in so much confusion and complexity that the project had to be abandoned. 
Even if the project had continued, the delivered product would be far different from the 
original specifications. As organisational needs changes, so does the specification hence 
change requests. This result with the final specification as informed by organisational needs 
to differ enormously from the original specifications, rendering the delivered product to be 
vastly different from the original expectations.   
4.6.2 Timelines Always Missed 
Problems are interrelated and so are changes, solutions, etc. With any change delays in time 
can never be avoided. The CoJ project also experienced this. Of crucial importance to all 
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projects is that, amidst delays and inflated costs the project should strive to achieve its 
objectives, when that does not happen it presents an unacceptable state of affairs. Most of the 
projects reviewed in this study experienced time delays due to changes made to some aspects 
of the projects.  
4.6.3 Changes Increases Costs 
With the interconnectedness in complexity, missed time lines, changes in scope etc., cost will 
undeniably escalate. This is a common factor to most of the projects reviewed. 
4.6.4 Huge Dependency on Consultants 
In general, organisations make use of consultants to develop their specifications because of 
their lack of knowledge and skills to document the specifications. This leads to organisations 
not fully understanding and unable to comprehend the specifications. Organisations also 
depend on consultants to give direction during the project life span. It is usually during the 
testing phase or at go-live that most realise that what was given is not what the organisation 
had in mind. The clarity of what is in the specifications versus what is actually needed 
develop only later in the project life rather than at project conceptualisation and initiation. 
The dependency on consultants from initiation could also be the reason some of the 
specifications are badly or incorrectly written.  
4.6.5 High Rate of Replacing Consultants and Service Providers 
This is a puzzling situation that is common throughout the world. Organisations bring 
consultants on board to develop the solution specifications for them and to help them 
implement the solutions. At a later stage in implementation when the direction the project is 
taking becomes clearer, organisations start to realise that things are not going as expected and 
subsequently consultants are always blamed and replaced. As a result there is no joint 
ownership to the problems and the evolving solution on most of the projects. There is also a 
tendency of replacing consultants every time the project experiences a chaotic stage, 
therefore using as many as possible consultants for one project. The underlying complexity 
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could be that organisations fail to fully understand and are not able to conceptualise what 
their needs are.  
4.6.6 Unrealistic Timelines 
Most of IT projects runs late and misses the deadline amidst careful and intense planning. 
The author’s view is that while this is caused by some projects simply underestimating the 
efforts required to achieve the project objectives, the fundamental reason is the failure to 
comprehend the complexity that is inherent in a project and its environment that when 
responding to the changes inflate cost, change in scope, delay timelines, require more 
resources, effort, etc. are bound to happen. This is also adversely caused by the fact that 
organisations fail to comprehend their specifications and therefore set unrealistic timeline.  
4.6.7 Inconsistent and Unreliable Procurement Processes 
This is not only unique to SA. Procurement process is usually hasty and ignores critical 
elements that can determine the failure or success of a project.  
4.7 The Unique SA Situation 
South Africa is a developing country with many laws in place to undo the effects of the 
apartheid era. Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment is one of them. We have seen the 
CIPRO and the Department of Home Affairs projects not realising implementation phase 
despite costs being incurred. It is the author’s observation that there could be a relation 
between projects that failed to be implemented and BBBEE laws or compliance to these. It 
could be that the BBBEE mission is regarded as fundamental and is achieved at the cost of 
organisations’ interest. The awarding of the CIPRO tender was halted as a result of problems 
created under the auspice of following BBEEE rules. The need to pay the service provider 
before delivery of services reflects financial instability. The same could be argued for the 
poor delivery that riddled the Department of Home Affairs project as lack of knowledge 
resulting from compliance to BBEEE rules.  
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4.8 Conclusion 
 All the common factors identified above are symptoms of underlying complexity in the 
environment and also in the solution being implemented. What does all this mean? Where do 
all the projects get it wrong? How to get it right? The facts reveal that IT projects in general 
in the world are challenged in terms of delivery, scope, timelines and cost. What is inherently 
similar in all of them is the fact that they are always working against a fast passed change in 
the IT domain – forces from the external environment, manifesting themselves in the 
organisations therefore riddled as a result by complexity. Also that often what is believed to 
be what is needed is eventually not exactly the same for both the service providers and the 
contracting organisations. Another underlying factor that is worth researching is what leads to 
the discord between what organisations think they need and what service providers believe 
organisations needs which is predominant in the IT space? You order a chair or a table or 
even a car with the specifications and you always almost get it right – but this is usually not 
the case with Information Technology solutions. The reason could be that the knowledge 
organisations have about their needs and situation is not aligned to what the technology can 
provide as a solution or the knowledge of the IT companies of problems separate from the 
solution itself. It could also be that the knowledge of the service providers is only on their 
solution and is therefore limited and the two knowledge domains fails to meet each other 
most of the times because of the rapid changes in the knowledge economy. What about the 
complexity of the real problems organisations are facing which they try to resolve with 
technology solution chosen?  ERP adoption projects are generally challenged in terms of 
successful implementation in most parts of the world. There is no identified or simple 
formula to get the implementation right. The variance between the delivered products and the 
specifications are many.  
The scope creep is also a common factor in many projects of this type, with the FBI project a 
distinctive example, which similarly to the CoJ, experienced huge scope creep. The scope 
creep was too high, at 80%, it eventually led to the abandoned of the project. Abandonment 
of a project is a concerning matter not only in South Africa., money is spent for an unworthy 
cause. What is interestingly noticeable is that complex ERP projects can equally succeed, the 
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Cape Town and the Winnipeg municipalities are classic examples. Reliance on consultants is 
also a point to be noted. What transpired in the CoJ project is not an isolated case but a 
similar pattern in most projects. Where there is complexity, there can never be a simple 
answer, a formula, the same answer for what is viewed to be similar problems. The dynamics 
in each environment makes every situation unique despite common problems and pursuit of 
common solutions. Even with the most organised organisations i.e FBI and CoJ there is an 
element of surprise. Where environmental changes are not appropriately responded to or 
unprecedented, i.e. FBI case files and the NHI abandonment of the mission is unavoidable at 
most times.  
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Chapter 5 
ERP Adoption from the 
Perspective of Sensemaking 
and Complexity 
This chapter provides an analysis and fuses the erudition of the previous chapters in relation 
to the sense behind the complexity and provides findings and recommendations. The focus is 
specifically on the analysis of the underlying forces behind what can be seen during ERP 
implementation; what really happened at Programme Phakama and provides 
recommendations. ERPs are recognised as the most imperative information technology 
infrastructure of modern companies86. 
5.1 Inescapable Challenges 
The Programme Phakama by the City of Johannesburg was founded and built on a solid 
foundation. The plans, the implementation methodologies and approaches were well designed 
and based on sound system development and project management methodologies. The 
                                                 
86 Park K, Kusiak K. 2005. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Operations Support Systems for Maintaining   
    Process Integration. International Journal of Production Research, 43 (19); 3959 –  3982. See Also, Allen L 
E. 2008. “Where good ERP implementations go bad: A case for continuity”. Business Process Management 
Journal, 14(3): 327–337. 
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problem the City needed to address with the technology solution was also well defined and a 
clear vision of improved services once the system is implemented was greatly anticipated. 
The plan was comprehensive and included business issues such as Stakeholder Management, 
Change Management and governance and management structures and processes. In essence 
best practices were followed. Despite all of the above, the project was overwhelmed with 
more changes than ever anticipated. The changes impacted the scope, costs and timelines and 
the combined average increase reached around 50%. It is therefore evident enough that the 
element of surprise in projects such as this is inevitable. There are various factors, that even 
though they seem to emanate separately, they are intrinsically linked and together contributed 
to what happened during the roll out of Programme Phakama. They are: 
5.1.1 Use of Best Practices 
Best practices have advantages when followed, however they also can have limitations in that 
they may limit the thinking, flexibility and creativity of those applying them. The 
shortcoming therefore, is the ignorance to other issues equally important that can have a 
crippling effect on the project preventing it from achieving its objectives. So using best 
practices is never a guarantee for success. The CoJ Programme Phakama used the City of 
Cape Town project Ukuntinga, amongst others, as a benchmark. The City of Cape Town 
managed to deliver the solution in a short period of time and the assumption made by the City 
of Johannesburg was that if the same principles and methodologies were used by the 
Programme Phakama, the same results will be achieved. This proved to be wrong. The CoJ 
failed to deliver the solution in the planned time, budget and scope because of its unique 
environment. The use of best practices brings with itself the confidence that the plan is 
attainable, resulting in rigid plans.  
5.1.2 Rigid Plans 
Even good plans are rendered useless if they are not flexible. The general problem with 
project plans is that they are made to be rigid and not flexible enough to be regarded as 
guidelines for the ERP implementation. A slight shift from the plan is viewed in a negative 
light. If the complexity of projects that implement ERP  solution were not underestimated and 
miscalculated, project plans, scope, budgets and timelines would be regarded as the starting 
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point that provide guidelines towards achieving the goal. When change is anticipated, an 
understanding that plans are merely a guideline will be developed. If this was the case, 
determination of project success or failure would not regard increased scope, budget and 
timelines in a negative light. If the complexity was anticipated and changes expected then the 
change in scope, costs and timelines would be regarded as an embracement of and response 
to the changes and actually the complexity in pursuit of a delivery of a usable solution. 
5.1.3 Under-estimated Complexity 
There are two factors, the element of under-estimation and the fact that ERP implementation 
is riddled with insurmountable complexity. The complexity of ERP solution implementation 
is underestimated whilst project plans are deemed to be the final plan and therefore an object 
to measure project success or failure against. Even where change is anticipated, it far exceeds 
the expectation. It therefore suffices to say, if the complexity is adequately estimated and the 
correct rate of changes anticipated, the element of surprise will be reduced to manageable 
levels. However, in many instances, it is not possible to estimate such vast changes to impact 
a single project. The element of surprise is also brought about by the lack of anticipation or 
underestimation of the changes which are bound in the environment in which the project 
naturally interacts and engages with. This further proves that, the pace of change in both 
information technology and in the environment of projects of large magnitude is very high. 
The changes in the projects are mainly due to the responses to those changes posed by the 
environment. Programme Phakama experienced a lot of these changes that originated from 
both internal and external environments of the organization and the project. External 
environmental changes include the new legislation introduced during project roll out, i.e. the 
Property Rates Act. The overwhelming number of dependencies that emanated from the 
promulgation of the Act could not have been imagined during planning. Internal 
environmental changes include unavailability of resources (personnel) at some stage, the 
change in City of Johannesburg leadership, the restructuring of the organisation and the 
change in service provider (contractor).  All these changes impacted the project and required 
necessary action to be taken which resulted in the change made to the original plans.  If 
Complexity Theory was consciously used in organisations, changes would be embraced and 
viewed in a positive light and therefore measurement of project success or failure would 
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focus on how well a project or an organization responded to those anticipated changes that 
were meant to sharpen and shape the project realization and to respond to the real problems 
on completion. Hence what is usually delivered in a project is different from what is in the 
plans, and this should be viewed as a good thing  
5.1.4 Timing 
A large number of the ERP adoption variances in many projects have a lot to do with when 
the ERP was implemented as much as it has to do with why, which solution and where. The 
ERP project by the City of Cape Town, City of Johannesburg and also that of a Winnipeg in 
Canada are similar, implemented in organisations that have the same mandate, but the 
uniqueness and dynamism in each as well as the time the projects were implemented greatly 
impacted the outcome of each project, resulting in the difference. i.e. there were legislative 
changes at the time of the CoJ project that directly impacted on the billing process. The 
promulgation of and therefore the requirement to comply with the Property Rates Act 
necessitated certain action from the project. This meant the project scope and plan were 
impacted, and inherently costs and timelines, although this impact was not a negative one. 
Incorporation of the Property Rates Act requirements in to the project’s scope was a positive 
move. Finalising the project first and then only addressing the Property Rate Act 
requirements later, would have created more problems, impacted costs negatively and 
rendered the implemented system inadequate and non-compliant. This was not the case 
during the implementation at the City of Cape Town. Therefore it suffices to say that the 
differences in the complexities in similar projects also relate to the time the projects are 
implemented and where they are being implemented.  
5.2 The Changing Nature of Business Requirements 
One aspect that emerge from this study is that the business requirements of IT solutions such 
as ERP are not stagnant and organisations have not yet realized that. This is also the case with 
the project of the City of Johannesburg. It is however a common problem to most projects 
reviewed in this study. In general the time between the initiation of ERP projects to the time 
implementation begins, takes an average of 18 months in the public sector. During this period 
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the approved business requirements that informed the plan, budget, scope and timelines 
changes. Business requirements cannot remain unchanged due to the interaction of various 
parts of the system called organisation and the complexity that emanates from the interaction 
within the system and with the system and its environment. Anderson states that 
organisations consist of processes and these processes are also affected by broader fields or 
environmental factors87. Therefore as the organisations evolve, so does the environment88. 
Stagnation of business requirements becomes an unrealistic expectation. The problem 
remains the same but the best way to resolve or address the problem changes as the 
interaction continues beyond the development and approval of business requirements. By the 
time a project resumes, the business requirements have changed so much that the project 
plans have to change. This is also due to the fact that the implementation stage in any project 
is closer to the interactions, the complexities and the realities of the situation than at 
initiation/ strategic level and planning stage. The first wave of changes in IT projects 
implementing ERP is mainly due to misalignment of the business requirements. Usually they 
are obsolete when implementation begins, resulting in a solution that responds to old 
requirements. There is a need to review business requirements to ensure that the solution 
implemented addresses current and real situations, after which other environmental changes 
may follow.  Business requirements should be regarded as a guideline to begin a project and 
changes to align the prevailing business requirements and the current ones must be 
anticipated by organisations. This will also address the issue that evaluation of projects 
concerns itself only with the time, cost and scope the product was delivered in, which is not 
aligned to the actual and current business requirements. Organisations and Project Managers 
need to understand that the plans, budgets, scope, timelines, implementation approaches are 
all evolving documents that needs to change as the situation changes. If this is not the case, 
organisations and Project Managers force projects to address current problems using 
                                                 
87 Anderson P. 1999. “Complexity theory and organization science”. Organisation Science, 10(3): 216–232. 
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yesterday’s solutions by standing by the original plan, budget, approach, scope and timelines. 
All these need to evolve as the changes in the environment are responded to. Unfortunately 
most projects fail to do this and results in failed projects that insisted on using the obsolete 
business requirements. It suffices to say, the evaluation of project success or failure is far 
more than just being on time, in budget and within timelines, because if changes are 
addressed and adequately responded to, it should be expected that budget, scope and 
timelines will change and therefore change should be viewed as good. The project by the City 
of Johannesburg, the FBI and the NPfIT are classic examples.  
 
The NPfIT project original timelines were for a period of ten years. Considering the fast 
paced changes in the information technology space and the complex nature of a project such 
as this and its environment, there is no doubt that the business requirements or the vision set 
will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve considering the many deliverables that will be 
obsolete by the time the projects ends. Hence the project was eventually scrapped before the 
projected timeline of ten years. It also had a lot of role players and stakeholders because of its 
scope. Managing it was a tall order, inherently. The FBI triology project saw its cost increase 
reach 89%. The failure to recognise that business requirements are not stagnant leads to 
underestimation of efforts, time and costs required, because the complex nature of the project 
was not taken into consideration in the planning. The change anticipated is usually minimal, 
resulting in scope, timelines and budget increases exceeding 50% in most cases. FBI Virtual 
Files Project, Programme Phakama and the NPFIT are evidence of this. If complexity is 
adequately considered, a high rate of change anticipated and the scopes, timelines and budget 
sufficiently estimated, the element of surprise will be reduced and the estimates of costs and 
scope will be much closer to reality. This will tremendously reduce the number of projects 
that overrun their budget and timelines by high margins. Programme Phakama needs to be 
applauded for focusing on resolving the current problems with current and correct solutions 
regardless of the risk of being on the edge of chaos. Every change was afforded the attention 
it deserved in order to appropriately respond to it. Most of these responses were followed by 
a re-planning session, and the testimony is the change request, of which only 45 were 
approved. The respond to the changes led to the project being out of scope, increased budget 
and delayed timelines.  
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5.3 The Insurmountable Complexity 
An ERP is an enterprise wide system that in many organisations affects almost all 
employees89. It is meant to provide one standard solution to the many challenges an 
organisation may be facing. Beside the fact that an ERP system consists of various 
components/modules that interact with one another, it also has to interface and integrate with 
other internal or external systems in an organisation. The seamless flow of information and 
processes between and amongst the parts and other systems brings in itself complexity that at 
many times is beyond the comprehension of those planning for the system. The scope of the 
implementation of an ERP project will naturally be wide because of the interconnectedness of 
the problems and the various parts that makes up the solution. This nature or characteristic of 
an ERP system and the pace of change in its environment does not allow for any project to be 
implemented without changes being made to the original plan. Complexity theory also 
requires managers to think and approach organisational challenges differently when pursuing 
performance improvements. The theory encourages an embracing of change and appropriate 
responses to the environment as both the organisation and the environment evolves. With 
these two factors, it is impossible to simplify an ERP solution implementation. It therefore 
means that complexity, changes, delays, in scoping and budget overruns should be accepted 
as the norm in ERP solution implementation. Even though they are necessary for control 
purposes, what is critical is the delivery of a usable solution on project completion. The same 
is true for the CoJ Programme Phakama, the changes and complexities could never have been 
correctly estimated. At the end, the project was so fraught with changes resulting from the 
complex nature of the system itself, the changes posed by the environment in which the 
system was implemented and the external factors which also played a big role.  
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5.4 Knowledge Economy, Sensemaking, Complexity Theory and 
ERP 
The Knowledge Economy is the environment in which productivity is derived from the 
interaction of knowledge upon knowledge rather than raw material90. The key value adding 
element in the Knowledge Economy is knowledge.  This knowledge originates and resides in 
various sources such as the environment and the organisations. One of the best tools used to 
collate and preserve this knowledge is by using electronic information sources to embed the 
knowledge. Another major characteristic of the Knowledge Economy is complexity which is 
a result of interactions of various parts of a system and other parts of other systems. The pace 
of change in the KE is fast and it destabilises and puts pressure on organisations and similarly 
on IT projects. In order to keep up with the change, Complexity Theory is introduced into this 
equation, seeking to find a way of coping with the complexity that undeniable exists. 
Complexity Theory is orientated towards improving organisational performance in terms of 
how well the organisation executes its tasks and responds to changes in its environments. 
According to the author, this is a reliable weapon to use to achieve this knowledge and 
managing it well.  
5.4.1 The Benefit of ERP Adoption in Organisation 
As much as Complexity Theory seeks to assist organisations in addressing complex 
problems, its complex holistic solutions such as ERP brings different kinds of problems to 
that of reductionism. A holistic approach to solving interrelated problems forces 
organisations to look for holistic solutions which are a challenge to manage. This results in 
solutions such as ERP that are large in scope, have huge cost and are difficult to manage in 
the presence of complexity. It can be concluded that the benefits of the holistic approach and 
its disadvantages creates a unique balance. The impact of turbulence and instability on a 
holistic solution such as ERP is far reaching and so are the benefits should implementation be 
                                                 
90 Cooke P, Schwartz D. 2007. Regional Knowledge Economies: An EU-UK and Israel perspective.  
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successful. Using the City of Cape Town as an example, it successfully implemented a usable 
solution within the set timelines and in less than three years managed to recover the total cost 
of implementing the ERP solution.  In instances where the adoption of ERP fails, the impact 
is devastating. The organisation also loses confidence. These result in huge financial loss and 
frustrations in the organisation or project. The Virtual Files project and the UK’s NPfIT are 
classic examples of those projects that started but failed. South Africa has its own unique 
situation where projects are doomed to failure even before they start, due to supply chain 
management laws. In these instances, organisations take longer to regain confidence and try 
again. ERP projects are then shelved for many years, with every aspect of the original plan 
and budget becoming obsolete.  
5.4.2 The Knowledge Economy 
The need to adapt quickly to change is the key to success, therefore change will always be a 
huge component of what organisations are managing in order to be correct and relevant with 
the solutions being implemented. KE is driven by various factors. According to Becerra-
Fernandez et al.91 it is driven by the following forces:  
 
 Increasing domain complexity 
 Accelerating market volatility  
 Intensified speed of responsiveness  
 Diminishing individual experience 
 
Knowledge Economy is characterised by complexity and it requires knowledge as a tool of 
trade to address and respond to the complexity and also to interact with the environment for 
productivity. The tools that are put in place to use knowledge successfully, in order to survive 
in the KE, are equally complex. A simple solution to the complex problems is inadequate. As 
a result, the tools that are put in place to enable organisations to benefit from interaction of 
                                                 
91 Becerra-Fernandez I, Gonzalez A, Sabherwal R. 2004. Knowledge Management Challenges, Solutions and  
    Technologies, 42. 
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various parts using knowledge are equally complex. Therefore Knowledge Economy can be 
regarded as = Complexity x Knowledge and the Environment x Complexity (Solutions) = 
Complexity. The Knowledge Economy is equals to the amount of knowledge required 
multiplied by existing complexity. The rate or the degree of complexity and the knowledge 
required to survive the complexity is determined by the Knowledge Economy. Also, the 
elements that constitute and contribute to the environment equates to the solutions and 
complexity. Knowledge evolves and exists in harmony with existing complexity, therefore 
the environment is meaningless if separated from the solution and the same applies to the 
solution if conceived independently from the environment it is intended to operate in and the 
complexity it is meant to address. The solution will not survive. Therefore, KE requires 
intense knowledge in the midst of complex interconnected problems. Similarly, the 
environment (which is bound and part of the KE) consists of complex solutions resulting in 
complexity everywhere, i.e. in the problem, in the solution and the environment in which it is 
implemented. The Knowledge Economy results in complex problems that require knowledge 
and complex solutions resulting with no simplicity but further complexity. The complexity of 
ERP implementation will always go beyond the comprehension of the human mind, 
especially those making the strategic decisions and planning.  
5.4.3 Sensemaking Spiral 
There is a continuous sensemaking process that takes place in organisations in an effort to 
understand, find meaning and respond appropriately to the changes and turbulences in the 
environment in which ERPs are implemented92. Sensemaking takes place, necessitated by the 
changes and the interaction between components that constitutes a system in an ERP project 
and also environmental factors. Using the equations in 5.4.2 above, Sensemaking is used to 
find meaning of the overwhelming turbulence and instability. The environment sends 
messages, changes, instability and turbulence to the organisations and they must perform 
Sensemaking to determine the meaning and decide which response to make, using the 
                                                 
92 Patel NV. (1999). The Spiral of Change Model for Coping with Changing and Ongoing Requirements. 
Journal for Requirements Engineering, 4, 77-84 
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knowledge they already possess. The author refers to this Sensemaking process as the spiral 
of Sensemaking. It is a continuous process that takes place every time there is a change and 
the response to the change feeds back to the environment which then creates a new change. 
This is reflected in the diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 8: The Spiral of Sensemaking (Author’s Formulation) 
The change can originate from the internal or external environment of the project. During the 
implementation of Programme Phakama, the Property Rates Act was promulgated and the 
compliance to this Act could not be avoided or ignored. It directly impacted the billing 
process for the municipal services which was the core of the SAP implementation. Adequate 
response by the organisation and in particular Programme Phakama to the Property Rates Act 
brought new angles or challenges as the response was fed back to the environment. Suddenly 
the Land Information System became a new requirement because the successful 
implementation and compliance to the Property Rates Act depended on the availability of 
reliable land information. The Geographic Information System’s (GIS) importance and 
priority in the project was elevated as its relationship to the land information is crucial. 
Programme Phakama also experienced changes or turbulences that have their origin in the 
internal environment. The Social Development department approved the City’s plan to assist 
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households that are child-headed, where pensioners are the sole breadwinners and those that 
earn below a certain threshold. The assistance was in the form of pre-determined percentage 
discount per household. This brought with it new challenges and dependencies for the billing 
component of the programme.  
 
In essence the interconnectedness of both the problems and the solutions result in 
complexities and a continuous need for sensemaking that never ends, resulting in changes to 
the plan, scope, budget and timelines. The re-planning sessions, changes in system 
implementation approach, scope, timelines and budget are a direct result of the changes in the 
internal and external environment and the responses to those changes. As the project and the 
organisation internalise the changes that originate in the external environment, it necessitates 
certain responses that changes the risk profile, dependencies and inevitably the ERP 
implementation plan and approach. As a result, the delays and inflated costs and timelines are 
not due to poor project management and governance. No project can plan for or anticipate 
changes in leadership and that the new leadership will restructure the organisation which 
affects the project deliverables. The original Programme Phakama plans were made based on 
the decision that a new entity will be established to manage the revenue and customer 
services department. When the new leadership changed this to a department instead, the 
project had to re-plan and accommodate the new change and the variables brought by it.  
 
During the sensemaking process, once a change is internalised, meaning is developed. 
Understanding and action, therefore depend upon the meaning assigned to any set of events93. 
The challenge in the City of Johannesburg is that the meaning was only aligned within a level 
or a group of individuals. It is unfortunately a reality that the sensemaking process takes place 
individually and alignment of meaning is level / group bound. Because of the hierarchical 
nature of the public sector it is difficult to align meaning throughout an organisation or 
project. These will result in various meanings attained at various levels for the same 
                                                 
93 Gioia D A, Chittipeddi K. 1991. “Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation”. Strategic  
    Management Journal, 12(): 433–448. 
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phenomena. The misalignment in meaning throughout various levels results in a discord in 
the appropriate responses to phenomena and mainly in the evaluation of the ERP adoption. 
The misalignment is caused by lack of communication and information flow between the 
political and the administrative management levels. The administrative management further 
consists of other levels such as the strategic level, senior management level and the 
operational level. The misalignment and the difference in the meaning is due to the fact that 
the people in the various groups or levels uses different cues and frameworks to arrive at a 
meaning. One such example is the many changes in the system implementation approach, full 
bang and the phased approach. It is stated therefore that, project management and the 
operational staff are closer to complexities than the political/strategic and the planning levels. 
Refer to figure 9 below that illustrates the difference in complexities at various levels.  
 
 
Figure 9: Complexity in Various Levels of the ERP Project (Author’s Formulation) 
Complexities, changes and actions are driven by real issues at operational level whilst the 
other groups are led by the political and strategic interests that apply different pressures. The 
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strategic level is concerned with the fact that a system must be implemented within a 
particular time and the approved budget whereas the operational level is concerned with 
implementing a system that is usable, addresses the real operational issues and improves the 
services regardless of how long it takes and how much it costs. According to the author, this 
replicates itself during ERP project evaluation in general. There are different kinds of 
complexities for the same phenomena in the same environment. As a result it is unavoidable 
that different cues and frames will be used arriving at different meanings, causing 
misalignment and confusion. Considering the number of changes Programme Phakama 
experienced, the amount of misalignment and confusion from sensemaking of the many 
occurrences will be high   
5.5 Strategy versus Importance of Implementation 
One concerning issue that riddles most of the ERP projects, including the CoJ Programme 
Phakama is the priority and the importance that, according to the author, is misplaced. The 
local government is naturally politically driven. The reason for introducing and implementing 
a change is always politically motivated first before it is operationally relevant.  Even for 
those that are operationally motivated first, falls prey of the fact that political reason usually 
steals the lime light. The problem with this approach is that, operational decisions become 
politically driven, limited and bounded to the political domain. This approach completely 
disregards the importance of correctly implementing the strategy and politics and political 
intent erodes the importance of strategy. This forces ERPs systems to be delivered regardless 
of whether they address the real business requirement. The problem is perpetuated by the 
complexities that vary in scale in all the levels and different cues, whereas different frames 
are used to arrive at a meaning in both the operational and the strategic and political levels. In 
order to address this, there is a need for constant communication and information flow 
between the levels in order to understand how and why the other level reached a certain 
meaning and took a certain action. This can be done through a representative of each level 
being part of the decision making process at each level, to bring synergies and appreciation of 
the cues, framework and subsequent meaning and actions taken. An operational expert will 
be part of the strategic engagements and a strategist and a planner be represented at 
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operational engagement. This is a tall order for a bureaucratic organisation such as local 
government, however it is by all means achievable if the commitment is there.  If this is done 
and an appreciation of the different thinking, assumptions and complexities experienced by 
each level attained, it will be possible to evaluate correctly and to understand the decisions 
and actions each level take and alignment of meaning and responses to change becomes 
possible. 
5.6 Evaluation 
During implementation, strategy informs planning and implementation of ERP projects. 
However the error made in most, if not all, of ERP project evaluations, is that the same 
sequence is followed when evaluating project implementation. The author states that, for the 
purpose of successfully adopting an ERP, priority and importance needs to be on strategy 
giving direction during implementation. However evaluation needs to follow the reverse 
pattern. Following the same sequence of importance for both implementation and evaluation 
encourages the rigidity of plans and budgets. It also encourages the delivery of a system 
based on the original obsolete business requirements while endorsing an inflexible strategy. 
The process leading to the decision and implementation of an ERP system can be divided into 
three layers; the strategic, planning and the implementation layers, all of which are exposed 
to the same changes, however differently, using different cues and frameworks and arriving 
at different meanings. Refer to figure 10 below:  
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Figure 10: ERP Project Evaluation Approach (Author’s Formulation) 
For evaluation to be correct and relevant, priority needs to be afforded to the implementation 
components of the ERP solution. Using Figure 2 (page 47) as a reference, the changes with 
regards to budget, scope and timelines viewed in relation to the environmental changes and 
turbulences in the KE requires more responses and actions from the implementation level 
than from other levels. Therefore success depends on the level. In many instances the 
strategic level regards a project as successful whereas the implementation level regards it 
differently. At the implementation level is where the functionality and the operations take 
place. This is a true reflection of the difference in perspective and meaning to phenomena in 
the levels. This will enable appreciation of the different complexities that exist throughout the 
levels and allow the flow of communication and information. The achievement of strategy is 
only momentary if the system delivered did not review business requirements, address the 
internal and external organisational challenges and adjusted the scope, budget and timelines 
accordingly. However implementation that considered all factors result in a system that will 
be used and a strategy that is achieved beyond momentary. The findings suggest that 
evaluation needs to be a two phased approach, a focus on political and strategic elements and 
another focus on the operational/implementation level. This is in order to accommodate the 
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complex nature of the environment, the solution and the misaligned meaning from 
sensemaking.  
5.7 Political Influence 
Decisions for operational efficiency are made by politicians and then made to fit 
operationally. This misplaces the drive of ERP implementation. Their need to justify ERP 
implementation first politically then operationally adds to the inherent challenges of ERP 
projects. Politicians must provide only the agenda, the strategist provides direction and 
guidance whilst operations in a municipal context need to determine and drive the tools and 
methodologies to achieve the latter. It is unfortunate that the political level and the strategic 
level have fused and that the decisions on tools and methodologies are made at these levels. 
This hinders project success as there will always be meddling because the tools and 
methodologies decisions were made at the political and strategic levels. The consequence of 
this is that the realistic cost is often inflated whereas efforts are underestimated and timelines 
unrealistic. ERP adoption needs to be operationally relevant, then strategically and politically 
justified. ERP adoption is not strategy but a means to achieve the strategy. This also affects 
the evaluation of ERP implementation because it focuses on the political success of the 
project and disregards the actual implementation at base level which is usually riddled with 
system malfunction.  
5.8 Conclusion 
Implementation of ERP is a difficult and very challenging task. The larger the scope, the 
higher the rate of change in a project which results in insurmountable complexity. Any good 
tools, methods and best practices available do not guarantee success and at times become a 
hindrance that has the potential to derail implementation. At the heart of it all is that in an 
organisation various meanings are given to a single phenomenon because throughout an 
organisation different cues and frames are used in the various levels. As a result each level 
within the organisation responds to the changes using independent cues and frames resulting 
in confusion and chaos.  
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Chapter 6 
Perspectives on 
Management Challenges 
As indicated in the methodology, this chapter focuses on developing alternative management 
understanding that can provide effective solution to ERP implementation. Based on the ERP 
implementation projects presented in this study, the inherent complexity is evident. This is 
mainly due to the size, holistic approach and the infinite number of people that interact and 
can be affected by ERP systems implementation and operation. The complexity is further 
infused by ERP systems not being exclusively internally based and focused but also 
externally focused and based. ERP systems are also aimed at external relations94. From 
various angles of interactions in the system, those involved use different cues and frames to 
arrive at different meanings for the same phenomenon. Sensemaking asserts that frames do 
not merge and are mutually exclusive. Frames are influenced by and have origin from the 
individual, the level the individual is operating at, the point of interaction with and in the 
system and the scale of the environmental influence and responsiveness of the individual 
making sense of the occurrence. This leads to various meanings for the same phenomenon 
and as such creates a problem for management. It therefore becomes critical for organisations 
implementing ERP systems to share assumptions and thinking which will help address the 
                                                 
94 Davenport T. 2000. Mission critical: realizing the promise of enterprise systems. Harvard Business School 
Press. 42    
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misalignment. This chapter will focus on the three main concepts that contribute to solving 
the management problem experienced during the adoption of huge IT solutions such as the 
ERP system.  
6.1 Complexity 
The interlinked problems the ERP system is meant to resolve requires a solution that can 
address the relationships holistically. Managing the whole has proven unsuccessful in many 
projects, i.e. the failed NPFIT in UK, the triology project by the FBI in the USA and the 
Programme Phakama by the City of Johannesburg to a great extent. The projects were 
characterised by overwhelming complexity which inherently can never be reduced. They 
were riddled with misaligned meaning from all those involved in the projects. The solution to 
this could be lying in the ability to identify the leverage points that exist and are sparsely 
populated in the web of the interlinked relations.  Once identified, the leverage points can be 
explored for the best result of the project, thus bringing stability and order.  
 
Figure 11: The Leverage Points (Author’s Formulation) 
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Leverage points can be defined as locations within a complex system where a small change in 
one part can produce substantial changes throughout the system95. Leverage points are not 
easy to identify, therefore not every manager in an ERP implementation project will be able 
to point to them. The ability to identify leverage points is developed over a period of time 
through constant involvement in ERP system implementation and also in applying the 
principles of complexity theory. As events unfold, frames solidified and cues developed, 
managers will realise that there are leverage points and will identify them. Managers will 
determine that trying to manage and explore every link in the interrelated solution and 
problems will lead to failure rather than success. Figure 11 above presents the reality of the 
many interrelated entities and that leverage points do exist amongst them. Represented by the 
red dots, they are not many but have far reaching value and benefit if identified and 
capitalised. In order to address the inability to manage the whole it becomes necessary to 
manage by only concentrating on the identified leverage points.  
There are various parts that make up the whole ERP system and its implementation also 
involves various stakeholders to enable the system to function fully and optimally. Some of 
the links, interconnections and the relationships are more crucial than others. Identifying and 
concentrating more on the leverage points provides added advantage rather than attempting to 
manage the whole. i.e. having an eye to identify those elements that are critical  for ERP 
implementation in the CoJ from the model used by the Cape Town project Ukunthinga and 
focusing less on other elements instead of copying the entire model can be regarded as a 
leverage point. The problem however is that, the leverage points are not always obvious, and 
it takes skilled leaders or visionary people in the organisation to recognise the leverage 
points. Once the leverage points are identified and more efforts are channelled to them, the 
capacity to cope with complexity increases and so does the chances for the project to succeed 
rather than when trying to manage the whole. This links to what is referred to as ordinary and 
extraordinary management. According to Jonathan Rosenhead and Stacey, extraordinary 
                                                 
95 Olson M M, Raffanti M A. 2006. Leverage Points, Paradigms and Grounded Action: Intervening in  
    Educational Systems. World Futures; 62. 533 - 541 
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management is what an organisation is required to do in order to be able to transform itself in 
situations of open-ended change96, 97.  
6.2 The Prominence and Variety of Frames in Sensemaking 
For individuals and organisations to make sense and develop meaning for an occurrence, 
frames and cues are used. In reality, ERPs are so large in scope and are in themselves 
complex that they cannot be put in a single frame. The occurrences during ERP systems 
implementation too, cannot be put into a single frame. Therefore, people in various levels in 
the organisation use various frames for the many parts and occurrences in the ERP system 
implementation. It becomes impossible to put ERP system implementation into a single 
frame or to align frames in the public sector because of its hierarchical structure and also the 
clustering of staff in the organisation into political, strategic and operational teams. Various 
frames exist for each level in the hierarchy whiles the availability of and use of cues varies 
for each level. A typical example of misalignment is when those in the strategic level and top 
management regard an ERP system to have been successfully implemented in an organisation 
whereas those in the operational level  and customers regards the implementation as a failure 
in the same organisation. In many instances this misalignment is usually contained and down 
played until the external environment identifies it. Only at this point does the alignment of 
frames take place and a mutual plan to move forward created. Therefore, the external 
environment plays a crucial role in aligning frames. What is crucial is for organisations to 
understand this and acknowledge that the frames cannot merge and exist mutually exclusive 
of each other. Once this understanding is attained, it becomes possible to appreciate the 
frames that other levels use and to endeavour to bring synergy in the organisation. This 
requires conscious and constant efforts before occurrence of a major setback to make it work.  
                                                 
96 Rosenhead  J. 1998. Complexity Theory and Management Practice.  A paper written by Jonathan Rosenhead.  
   Available:  http://www.human-nature.com/science-as-culture/rosenhead.html 
97 Stacey R. 1996. Complexity and Creativity in Organizations. 53 
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6.3 The Value of Information and Communication 
Once an understanding that there are various frames that exist in an organisation for the same 
occurrence is attained, it becomes crucial and rewarding to share the assumptions and 
thinking in order to channel and drive the multiple frames and cues towards alignment. This 
can be achieved through continuous flow of information and constant communication. Both 
informal and formal communication mechanisms needs to be used in order to reach all levels 
of employees in an organisation and stakeholders in all perspectives of their involvement in 
the ERP system, i.e. user perspective, social context perspective, economic/financial context 
perspective, customer perspective, etc. The various communication channels such as: 
brainstorming exercises, formal meetings, brochures, broadcast messages and reports can be 
used to harness the full benefit of the communication and information flow. Nonaka states 
that, what makes sense in one context can change meaning or lose its meaning when 
communicated to people in a different context98. This is further supported by Donnellon who 
states that communication enables people to create equifinal meaning from which organised 
action can follow99. 
Formal communication usually works effectively for top and strategic levels in many 
organisations whereas informal communication works better for those in operational levels. 
In order to foster the development of associated frames and cues in ERP system 
implementation, the same messages or information needs to be disseminated using various 
channels and mechanisms in the organisation. The informal meetings usually yield more and 
better results than the formal and structured meetings. An informal community, which may 
range from public to secret in their profile, provides a rich and fertile source of knowledge 
and learning100.There are various informal methods that can be used fruitfully for all levels, 
                                                 
98 Nonaka I. 1991. Knowledge-Creating Company. Harvard Business Review. 96-104 
99 Donnellon A,  Gray B. Bougon M G. 1986. “Communication, Meaning, and Organized Action”. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 31(1):43-55. 
100 Kurtz C F, Snowden D J. 2003. The new dynamics of strategy: Sensemaking in a complex and complicated  
     world. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3): 462 – 483. See Also: Thomas J B, Clark S M, Gioia D A. 1993. 
“Strategic  
     Sensemaking and Organizational Performance: Linkages among Scanning, Interpretation, Action, and 
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such as credos, broadcast messages, information sharing sessions and brainstorming sessions, 
this will also ignite dialogue amongst and within the various levels. From a Knowledge 
Management perspective, the best lessons to draw from in this regard are from the Japanese 
companies such as Honda, Sharp and Canon. They provide a useful solution to address the 
management problem posed by overwhelming complexity.  
According to Nonaka, these Japanese companies used figurative language as a tool to 
exchange and communicate tacit knowledge successfully by simply using amongst others, 
metaphors and slogans101. The slogans and metaphors, which can be generally referred to as 
informal communication, can be used to align meaning in ERP projects throughout all levels. 
It therefore suffices to state that if tacit knowledge is effectively used to transform tacit 
knowledge to explicit, the same can be achieved in the alignment of meaning, since both 
Sensemaking and knowledge have their origin from the cognitive dimension. The 
communicated information informs the frames and cues in Sensemaking and as such can 
facilitate aligned meaning. The actions and achievements of success by these Japanese 
companies accurately reflect the ability to identify leverage points that many will fail to 
recognise. Management needs to welcome disorder as a partner and use instability positively 
by using figurative language. The frequent dialogue and communication helps create 
common cognitive grounds thus facilitating the alignment of meaning, even though it will not 
change the fact that different people, groups or levels will continuously use different frames 
and cues. Channelling effort to only those elements that provide far reaching benefit is 
important in ERP system implementation. The dialogue will cause considerable but healthy 
conflicts and disagreements but such result in aligned meaning. The communication and 
information flow needs to be held continuously beyond project completion, i.e. ERP 
adoption. The reason for that is that a solution to a problem creates another problem. 
Problems are interconnected and so are the solutions to those problems.  
                                                                                                                                                        
     Outcomes”. The Academy of Management Journal, 36(2): 239-270. 
101 Nonaka I. 1991. Knowledge-Creating Company. Harvard Business Review. 96-104 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The true measure of success in complexity is alignment. The fact is, complexity can never be 
avoided nor ignored in the knowledge driven economy. Thus an organisation that builds its 
capacity to identify the leverage points and channels more efforts into them, will succeed in 
the KE and survive the turbulent implementation of an ERP system. At the same time, 
communication is important and the continuous flow of information will assist organisations 
to align meaning whilst sharing insight, and frames which can be used to interpret the 
changes.  
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